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SEX, CAUSATION, AND ALGORITHMS:  
HOW EQUAL PROTECTION PROHIBITS 
COMPOUNDING PRIOR INJUSTICE 
DEBORAH HELLMAN* 
ABSTRACT 
U.S. constitutional law prohibits the use of sex as a proxy for other traits 
in most instances. For example, the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) may 
not use sex as a proxy for having the “will and capacity” to be a successful 
student. At the same time, sex-based classifications are constitutionally 
permissible when they track so-called “real differences” between men and 
women. Women and men at VMI may be subject to different training 
requirements, for example. Yet, it is surprisingly unclear when and why 
some sex-based classifications are permissible and others not. This question 
is especially important to examine now as the use of predictive algorithms, 
some of which rely on sex-based classifications, is growing increasingly 
common. If sex is predictive of some trait of interest, may the state—
consistent with equal protection—rely on an algorithm that uses a sex-based 
classification? 
This Article presents a new normative principle to guide the analysis. I 
argue that courts ought to ask why sex is a good proxy for the trait of 
interest. If prior injustice is the likely reason for the observed correlation, 
then the use of the sex classification should be presumptively prohibited. 
This Anti-Compounding Injustice principle both explains and justifies 
current doctrine better than the hodge-podge of existing rules and concepts 
and provides a useful lens through which to approach new cases.  
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INTRODUCTION
In a case that garnered significant attention, the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin considered whether an algorithm deployed to predict recidivism 
may use the sex of a criminal defendant to inform the sentencing judge.1 
The Wisconsin court concluded that the use of sex within the algorithm was 
permissible because it did not violate the U.S. Constitution’s guarantee of 
due process. But the court left open the question whether it might, 
nonetheless, violate equal protection.2 Although the Supreme Court denied 
cert in the defendant’s attempted appeal,3 the growing use of sex in states’ 
risk assessment tools places an increasing onus on the Court to weigh in on 
the issue.4 The resolution of this issue matters legally and practically. Use 
of sex has the potential to help women significantly. Women commit fewer 
 
1. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016). 
2. Id. at 765–67. 
3. Loomis v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017). 
4. See J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-Based 
Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1381 (2011) (“After all, many risk instruments do use gender as a 
criterion . . . .”); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of 
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 804–05 (2014) (“[A] growing number of U.S. jurisdictions are 
adopting policies that deliberately encourage judges to do all of these ‘don’ts.’ These jurisdictions are 
directing sentencing judges to explicitly consider a variety of variables that often include socioeconomic 
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crimes overall, and especially fewer violent crimes.5 For this reason, sex is 
used within predictive algorithms because it strongly correlates with the 
likelihood of committing crime, particularly violent crime.6 If women are 
not grouped together with more violent men, women may be sentenced 
more lightly and released on parole more frequently.7 
May states use sex-based classifications to determine how men and 
women are treated in this context? Perhaps surprisingly, U.S. constitutional 
law is not clear on this point. Traditionally, sex-based classifications are 
subject to “intermediate scrutiny.” Whatever canonical phrases one uses to 
describe this level of review—“exceedingly persuasive justification,” 8 
“substantially related to the achievement of an important governmental 
objective”9—intermediate scrutiny is intermediate, neither as demanding as 
“strict scrutiny” nor as permissive as “rational basis review.” This 
placement suggests that the use of sex-based classifications is sometimes 
constitutional. Two developments (one older and one more recent) make 
that inexact precept even more difficult to utilize. First, in the 1996 case 
United States v. Virginia,10 the Supreme Court invalidated the male-only 
admissions policy at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) in a manner that 
some judged to be a version of strict, rather than intermediate, scrutiny.11 
Second, there has long been an exception to sex-based equal protection 
 
5. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 765–66 (concluding that “men will always receive higher risk scores 
than otherwise-identical women” (citing Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific 
Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 813 (2004), John Monahan, A Jurisprudence 
of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 
416 (2006) (“That women commit violent acts at a much lower rate than men is a staple in criminology 
and has been known for as long as official records have been kept.”))). 
6. Id. 
7. John Lightbourne, Damned Lies & Criminal Sentencing Using Evidence-Based Tools, 15 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 327, 339 (2017) (“Tools that include gender as an independent variable lead to 
inequalities in sentencing that generally disfavor men.”); Michael Tonry, Legal and Ethical Issues in the 
Prediction of Recidivism, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 167, 170 (2014) (noting that Virginia sentencing 
guidelines use male gender “as a factor that reduces an offender’s likelihood of being diverted from an 
otherwise applicable prison sentence. To my knowledge female gender is nowhere used as an 
aggravating factor. Being female in Virginia is a mitigating factor relative to the treatment of men.”). 
8. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). 
9. See e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 459 (1981) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 
190 (1976)). 
10. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
11. See id. at 573–74 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, United 
States v. Virginia’s New Gender Equal Protection Analysis with Ramifications for Pregnancy, 
Parenting, and Title VII, 50 VAND. L. REV. 845, 873–75 (1997); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a 
Pragmatic Understanding of Status-Consciousness: The Case of Deregulated Education, 50 DUKE L.J. 
753, 819 (2000) (“[A]lthough the majority opinion [in VMI] does not expressly claim that sex is a suspect 
classification, its word choice in describing the applicable test suggests this result nonetheless.”); 
Deborah L. Brake, Reflections on the VMI Decision, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 35, 36 (1997) (“While 
the Court stopped short of explicitly adopting strict scrutiny for sex-based classifications, the opinion 
includes a number of indicators suggesting that the standard applied in VMI is essentially as rigorous as 
today's strict scrutiny standard.”). 











doctrine. When sex-based differential treatment is grounded in so-called 
“real differences,” it is permissible.12 Yet recent cases demonstrate that this 
exception is growing increasingly amorphous. 13  Together these two 
developments suggest that the constitutional law governing sex-based 
classifications is ripe for reexamination. 
At the same time, the use of “big data” and machine learning to develop 
algorithms for a wide range of contexts including not only criminal justice 
but also employment,14 lending,15 and targeted advertising16 is becoming 
more common. May these algorithms use sex? And if so, how? Of course, 
only some of these contexts involve state actors and so only some will be 
governed by the constitutional law of sex discrimination. However, the 
interpretation of statutes governing the use of sex-based classification often 
is informed by constitutional law.17 
 
12. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 62–63 (2001). 
13. See, e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017) (invalidating the use of sex-
based classification within one portion of U.S. immigration law). Compare Tagami v. City of Chicago, 
875 F.3d 375 (7th Cir. 2017) (upholding an ordinance forbidding only females from baring their breasts 
against an equal protection challenge on the grounds that intermediate scrutiny was satisfied), with State 
v. Lilley, 204 A.3d 198 (N.H. 2019) (upholding an ordinance forbidding only females from baring their 
breasts against an equal protection challenge on the grounds that the statute does not differentiate on the 
basis of sex), cert. denied sub nom. Lilley v. New Hampshire, 140 S. Ct. 858 (2020). 
14. Darrell S. Gay & Abigail M. Kagan, Big Data and Employment Law: What Employers and 
Their Legal Counsel Need to Know, 33 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 191, 191 (2018) (“One significant such 
development is employers’ growing tendency to use big data to answer their most pressing questions.”). 
15. Matthew Adam Bruckner, The Promise and Perils of Algorithmic Lenders’ Use of Big Data, 
93 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 3 (2018). 
16. Peter S. Menell, 2014: Brand Totalitarianism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 787, 807 (2014) (“Big 
Data increases advertising’s ability to persuade by allowing specifically targeted advertising to be 
delivered in a covert manner, greatly increasing its ability to manipulate its audience.”). 
17. See Ann E. Freedman, Sex Equality, Sex Differences, and the Supreme Court, 92 YALE L.J. 
913, 930 (1983) (“The Justices’ disagreements about employment discrimination law under Title VII 
have generally paralleled their conflicts over equal protection doctrine.”); Stephanie Bornstein, The Law 
of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-Family Conflicts of Men, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1297, 1312–13 (2012) 
(“Through these and the cases that followed, Title VII jurisprudence defining sex discrimination 
paralleled the definition Ginsburg had established under equal protection: Distinctions or penalties at 
work based on gender stereotypes—or an individual's failure to conform to them—may constitute sex 
discrimination against women and men.”); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145 (1976) (“The 
concept of ‘discrimination,’ of course, was well known at the time of the enactment of Title VII, having 
been associated with the Fourteenth Amendment for nearly a century, and carrying with it a long history 
of judicial construction. When Congress makes it unlawful for an employer to ‘discriminate . . . because 
of . . . sex . . . ,’ without further explanation of its meaning, we should not readily infer that it meant 
something different from what the concept of discrimination has traditionally meant . . . .”), superseded 
by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2018), as recognized in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 89 
(1983); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 n.20 (1977) (“In the case of a state employer, the bfoq 
exception would have to be interpreted at the very least so as to conform to the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The parties do not suggest, however, that the Equal Protection Clause 
requires more rigorous scrutiny of a State's sexually discriminatory employment policy than does Title 
VII. There is thus no occasion to give independent consideration to the District Court's ruling that 
Regulation 204 violates the Fourteenth Amendment as well as Title VII.”); Morris v. Oldham Cty. Fiscal 
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Now is thus an apt time to revisit the question when, and if, sex-based 
classifications should be constitutionally permitted. The issue is timely as 
sex-based classifications are used in the algorithms relied on by many states 
to predict recidivism,18 and it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court can 
avoid addressing the issue for too long. 
Current equal protection doctrine does not provide a clear answer. It does 
not because sex-based equal protection doctrine is both ill-defined and hazy 
and, at the same time, shifting and unsettled. This Article proposes a new 
norm around which the doctrine can cohere, one which will provide 
guidance in answering the many questions—like the one raised in Loomis—
that the use of algorithmic decision-making will give rise to. 
Sex-based classifications are sometimes permissible and sometimes 
impermissible under current doctrine. The doctrine utilizes two conceptual 
schemas to identify impermissible uses of sex-based classifications: the fit 
framework and stereotyping. When sex is too loose a proxy for some target 
trait or when it relies on a stereotype, it is impermissible. By contrast, when 
the sex-based classification is grounded in a “real difference” between men 
and women, it is permissible. While seemingly promising, these schemas 
are unhelpful because the degree of fit is unspecified, the concept of 
stereotyping is undefined and the designation of a “real difference” is 
normatively unmoored. 
Yet, imminent within the doctrine are the seeds of an alternative 
approach. The real differences doctrine correctly focuses on whether sex is 
causally related to the trait for which it is a proxy, rather than whether it is 
merely correlated with the target trait. What is missing, however, is a focus 
on what causal mechanisms are morally and constitutionally problematic. 
The heart of the normative contribution of this Article picks up where the 
doctrine leaves off. I argue that when a history of sex-based injustice 
provides a plausible causal explanation for the observed correlations 
between sex and other traits, then sex-based classifications are 
presumptively problematic. For example, in 1973 when the canonical sex- 
discrimination case Frontiero v. Richardson19  was decided, sex was an 
accurate proxy for having a dependent spouse. In deciding whether the 
armed services could use sex as a proxy for having a dependent spouse in 
the context of providing benefits, the Supreme Court focused on how good 
a proxy sex was for dependency.20 Instead, the Court should have focused 
on why significantly more men had dependent spouses than did women. 
 
employment discrimination claim under Title VII mirrors that which must be made to recover on an 
equal protection claim under section 1983.”). 
18. See supra note 4.  
19. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
20. See infra note 162 and accompanying text. 











Prior sex-based injustice that kept women from employment opportunities 
likely caused the correlation. As sex was an accurate proxy for dependency 
because of prior sex-based injustice, its use should be presumptively 
impermissible. 
By contrast, when no such plausible causal hypothesis is present, then 
the sex-based classification may be permissible. For example, different 
fitness requirements for women than for men are generally seen as 
permissible.21 While sex is an accurate proxy for the ability to do significant 
numbers of push-ups or chin-ups, just as sex was an accurate proxy for 
dependency, the correlation between sex and chin-up ability is not likely 
caused by sex-based injustice. As a result, the use of an explicit sex-based 
classification in differential training requirements may be permissible. I say 
“may” here rather than “is” because there is more than one reason that sex-
based classifications are morally and constitutionally problematic. 22  If 
another reason is relevant, the sex-based classification may still be 
impermissible for that reason. 
Current equal protection doctrine is unclear and under-theorized 
regarding whether and when sex-based classifications are permissible. This 
Article offers a more coherent and normatively appealing account, which, 
like current doctrine, permits some sex-based classifications and prohibits 
others. However, unlike current doctrine, this account draws the line 
between permissible and impermissible uses of sex-based classifications in 
a manner that is reasoned and defensible. 
The constitutional principle I offer rests on the moral claim that 
governmental actors have obligations to avoid compounding prior injustice, 
including injustice for which they are not responsible.23 In my view, this 
Anti-Compounding Injustice (ACI) principle is already inchoate in equal 
protection doctrine. It provides a normatively appealing account of 
canonical sex-based equal protection cases, like Frontiero. In addition, the 
 
21. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, (1996); Bauer v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 
2016). 
22. See, e.g., DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? (2008) (arguing that 
laws and policies that distinguish among people are wrong when and because they are demeaning) 
[hereinafter HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG?]; BENJAMIN EIDELSON, DISCRIMINATION 
AND DISRESPECT (2015) (arguing that laws and policies that distinguish among people are wrong when 
they fail to respect the autonomy of individuals); TARUNABH KHAITAN, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION 
LAW (2015) (arguing that laws and policies that entrench the disadvantage of groups suffering pervasive 
disadvantage are wrong because such pervasive disadvantage interferes with a person’s freedom); 
SOPHIA MOREAU, FACES OF INEQUALITY (forthcoming 2020) (arguing that discrimination is wrong for 
three distinct reasons including that it unfairly subordinates, it interferes with important deliberative 
freedoms, and it denies access to basic goods). 
23. The claim I advance in this Article is that governmental actors have an obligation to avoid 
compounding prior injustice. Non-state actors may have similar obligations. In saying that state actors 
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ACI principle offers a way to sympathetically reconstruct the “real 
differences” exception. Once we recognize the ACI principle at work, it is 
easy to see how it can be extended to help determine whether sex can be 
used in risk assessment tools and other predictive algorithms. 
The advent of big data together with machine learning is likely to 
substantially increase the influence of the past on the future.24 Data-driven 
analysis is inherently based on the past. What is data, after all, but 
information about past events? Yet, equal protection law has often 
functioned, at least in part, to disrupt the grip of the past on the future.25 If 
technological advances create a situation in which the past will control the 
future to a significantly greater degree, it will become necessary to revisit 
the current legal settlements. This Article presents a reconstruction of 
current doctrine that provides the tools needed to handle these new 
developments. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes State v. Loomis, 
focusing particularly on its treatment of sex classifications in the context of 
recidivism risk predictions. Part II turns to current equal protection law and 
its treatment of sex-based classifications. In this part, I describe the 
organizing principles that define when sex-based classifications are 
presumptively impermissible and the central exception outlined in the 
jurisprudence that delineates when sex-based classifications are 
permissible. The goal of this part is to show that the doctrine is confused 
and normatively ungrounded. Part III offers an alternative approach. There, 
I describe and defend the ACI norm, demonstrating its coherence with 
central equal protection cases dealing with sex-based classifications while 
providing an appealing normative ground for the doctrine. Part IV applies 
this revised approach to the question of whether the use of sex-based 
classifications in predictive algorithms violates equal protection. A 
conclusion follows. 
 
24. See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A 
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 329–50 (2019) (describing how the rise of 
behavioral and consumer analytics imperils “the right to the future tense”). 
25. See, e.g., Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344, 348 (1st Cir. 1975) 
(understanding equal protection in the following way: “[A] burden now rests upon the proponent of any 
sex-based classification to demonstrate that there is a convincing reason, apart from convention, for its 
existence.”). 











I. LOOMIS TEES UP THE QUESTION 
In 2016, in a case that attracted significant attention,26 the Supreme Court 
of Wisconsin held that an algorithmic risk assessment tool could be used, 
with some limitations, in the context of sentencing.27 In State v. Loomis, the 
Defendant brought several challenges to the sentencing judge’s reliance on 
the risk assessment tool COMPAS,28 including that COMPAS violated his 
right to due process because it took his gender into consideration.29 The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected this claim for two reasons. First, the 
court held that because the use of gender “promotes accuracy,” its use by 
COMPAS and the State of Wisconsin did not violate due process.30  In 
addition, the court held that the Defendant had not shown that “the 
sentencing court actually relied on gender as a factor in sentencing”31 and 
so due process was not violated. 
In the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s view, due process requires fair 
procedures and a procedure that increases accuracy is fair. The court 
explicitly did not consider whether an equal protection-based challenge 
would be more successful, as Loomis had not raised the issue.32 Loomis thus 
tees up the important question: May risk assessment tools use sex as one of 
the traits on the basis of which to calculate risk, consistent with the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection? Some scholars believe that any 
use of sex in an algorithmic tool deployed by the state would violate equal 
protection. 33  Others disagree, asserting that so long as sex is highly 
predictive, it is permissible.34 In Loomis itself, the man sentenced using 
 
26. Criminal Law—Sentencing Guidelines—Wisconsin Supreme Court Requires Warning Before 
Use of Algorithmic Risk Assessments in Sentencing—State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016), 130 
HARV. L. REV. 1530 (2017); Ashley Deeks, The Judicial Demand for Explainable Artificial Intelligence, 
119 COLUM. L. REV. 1829, 1844–45 (2019); Anne L. Washington, How to Argue with an Algorithm: 
Lessons from the COMPAS-ProPublica Debate, 17 COLO. TECH. L.J. 131 (2018); Mitch Smith, A Case 
Is Putting the Use of Data to Predict Defendants’ Futures on Trial, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2016, at A18; 
Ed Yong, A Popular Algorithm Is No Better at Predicting Crimes Than Random People, THE ATLANTIC 
(Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/01/equivant-compas-algorithm/5 
50646/ [https://perma.cc/8CQW-V7CW]. 
27. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016). 
28. COMPAS stands for “Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative 
Sanctions.” Id. at 753 n.10. 
29. Id. at 765. The court in Loomis uses the term “gender” rather than “sex” but it is not clear 
that by doing so the Loomis court means to focus on a social identity rather than a biological sex. 
30. Id. at 767 (holding that “COMPAS’s use of gender promotes accuracy that ultimately inures 
to the benefit of the justice system including defendants”). 
31. Id.  
32. Id. at 766. 
33. Starr, supra note 4; Lightbourne, supra note 7 (arguing that the use of gender in risk 
assessment in the criminal justice context violates equal protection). 
34. Monahan, supra note 5; Jon Kleinberg and co-authors present a hypothetical in which an 
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COMPAS petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court,35 but the petition 
was denied. While we cannot know why the Supreme Court declined to take 
up the case, it is interesting to note that the United States, in its amicus brief 
urging the Supreme Court to decline review, argued in part that 
“[p]rudential factors” weigh against review because only one other court of 
last resort has addressed the issue and because the “recent emergence of 
actuarial risk assessments” suggest that further study is warranted.36 This 
Article contributes to that important project. 
In my view, the use of sex-based classifications is sometimes permissible 
and sometimes not, but its permissibility should depend on more than 
accuracy. In order to set the stage for that normative claim, the next Part 
explores the inadequacy of the current doctrine. A brief aside about the use 
of the terms “sex” and “gender” is in order before I proceed. Feminist 
scholars use these terms to refer to different things: Sex refers to the 
biological, gender to the social.37 A person is sexed female if she has certain 
biological characteristics. She is a woman if she so identifies or is identified 
so by others because she acts in certain ways that are socially constructed 
as feminine. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Loomis uses the term 
“gender”38 but does not appear to use it in a way that distinguishes it from 
sex.39 This usage is consistent with Supreme Court equal protection cases 
that seem to use the terms interchangeably.40 Consistent with that usage, I 
will use the terms interchangeably in this Article but when differences 
between the biological and the social are relevant, I will make that clear. 
 
ratings are more predictive of future success for men and past sales levels are more predictive of future 
success for women, the algorithm will improve both accuracy and the job prospects of women if it takes 
the sales associate’s sex into account. Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan & Cass R. 
Sunstein, Discrimination in the Age of Algorithms, 10 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 43 (2018).  
35. Loomis v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 2290 (2017) (denying cert.). 
36. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 12, Loomis v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 2290 
(2017) (No. 16-6387). In addition, the United States emphasized that the Wisconsin Supreme Court had 
not resolved how gender played a role and thus the case was a poor vehicle for consideration of this 
issue. Id. at 19–20. 
37. See Mari Mikkola, Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Oct. 27, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-gender/ [https://perma.cc/4P9 
P-D38K]. 
38. The court describes the claim in this way: “Loomis asserts that because COMPAS risk scores 
take gender into account, a circuit court’s consideration of a COMPAS risk assessment violates a 
defendant’s due process right not be sentenced on the basis of gender.” State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 
749, 765 (Wis. 2016). 
39. Id. The term “sex” nowhere appears in the case. 
40. Lisa Mottet, Modernizing State Vital Statistics Statutes and Policies to Ensure Accurate 
Gender Markers on Birth Certificates: A Good Government Approach to Recognizing the Lives of 
Transgender People, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 373, 387 n.44 (2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court uses both 
terms in its jurisprudence relating to women's constitutional rights and Congress also has used both sex 
and gender in different civil rights statutes, while not intending a different meaning.”). 











II. EQUAL PROTECTION AND SEX-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS 
Sex-based classifications are subject to heightened review under current 
equal protection doctrine. This means that any law or governmental policy 
or practice that distinguishes on the basis of sex must be supported by “an 
exceedingly persuasive justification” 41  or by “important governmental 
objectives” and the means adopted must be “substantially related to the 
achievement of those objectives.”42 In addition, laws, policies, and practices 
that do not explicitly distinguish between men and women but which 
negatively affect women or men can also be challenged.43 However, as a 
matter of constitutional law, intermediate scrutiny is only warranted in such 
disparate impact cases if the governmental action was adopted “‘because 
of,’ not merely ‘in spite of’”44 the disparate impact on one sex or the other. 
This basic framework is filled in by two important organizing ideas and 
by one significant exception. The two organizing ideas are what I term the 
fit framework and concept of stereotyping. According to the fit framework, 
the tighter the fit between the sex-based proxy and the trait that sex is used 
as a proxy for (its target), the more likely the sex-based classification is to 
be upheld.45 The concept of stereotyping also works to sort permissible from 
impermissible uses of sex-based classifications. While it is unclear exactly 
what stereotyping is, as I argue below, stereotyping is seen as bad, and when 
the Supreme Court concludes that the use of a sex-based classification relies 
on a stereotype, this statement precedes the invalidation of the law or policy 
at issue.46 
In addition to these two organizing ideas, there is an important exception 
to the application of intermediate scrutiny to sex-based classifications: the 
“real differences” doctrine.47 When sex-based classifications are based on 
so-called “real differences,” then they are more likely to be upheld either 
because intermediate scrutiny simply does not apply or because it takes a 
form that is easier to pass. 48  The discussion of the fit framework and 
stereotyping helps to elucidate the real differences exception. If sex-based 
classifications are impermissible when the fit between sex and its target is 
too loose or the sex-based classification relies on a stereotype, this implies 
 
41. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). 
42. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
43. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274–80 (1979) (upholding a Massachusetts 
law that provided a lifetime preference for veterans in civil service jobs despite the significant negative 
impact on the job prospects of women but acknowledging that some disparate impact is impermissible). 
44. Id. at 279 (stressing that the policy was adopted to aid veterans rather than to disadvantage 
women). 
45. See infra Part II.A. 
46. See infra Part II.B. 
47. See infra Part II.C. 
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that the sex-based classifications are grounded in real differences when sex 
is a perfect proxy for the target trait or when it does not rely on a stereotype. 
Each part of the doctrine will be examined in more detail below. 
A. The Fit Framework 
Sometimes laws and policies use one trait as a proxy for another.49 For 
example, a law that requires that drivers be sixteen or older to drive uses 
age as proxy for the skill and maturity to drive safely. When the trait that is 
used as a proxy is not a “suspect trait” under equal protection doctrine, then 
only rational basis review applies.50 This means, at least in part, that the 
degree of connection between the proxy trait and its target can be quite 
loose.51 One can understand rationality review as a requirement that the 
proxy trait at least be positively correlated with its target.52 
A focus on the fit between proxy and target trait as the lens through 
which to understand and organize equal protection doctrine has its roots in 
an influential 1949 article by Jacob Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek. 53 
According to Tussman and tenBroek, there is a “paradox”54—as they term 
it—that underlies all equal protection doctrine: laws must classify and 
thereby distinguish between people and treat them differently. This 
observation sets up a question: When does such differentiation violate equal 
 
49. Deborah Hellman, Two Types of Discrimination: The Familiar and the Forgotten, 86 CALIF. 
L. REV. 315 (1998) (describing the two mechanisms by which a trait can be used to discriminate between 
people as proxy and non-proxy discrimination). 
50. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83–84 (2000). 
51. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (upholding a New 
York City regulation that prohibited advertising on vehicles except when advertising the business of the 
owner on the weak grounds that “local authorities may well have concluded that those who advertise 
their own wares on their trucks do not present the same traffic problem” as those who advertise for 
others). The law or policy must also have a legitimate governmental purpose and when it does not, it can 
be invalidated for that reason. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) 
(invalidating a law that restricted food assistance to households of related persons on the grounds that it 
was motivated by animus toward hippies). 
52. Whether in fact rationality review demands such a connection is not clear, as the deference 
courts accord to legislatures about the existence of such a connection belies the contention that such a 
connection must exist. See Deborah Hellman, Two Concepts of Discrimination, 102 VA. L. REV. 895, 
931–39 (2016); see, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993) (asserting that “a 
legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation 
unsupported by evidence or empirical data”); Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 367–68 (1971) (noting 
that the reason for a statutory distinction was “tenuous . . . but we cannot conclude that it is 
constitutionally vulnerable”); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (upholding a New 
Orleans ordinance forbidding all push cart vendors from the French Quarter but exempting two vendors 
who had been operating for at least eight years). 
53. Jacob Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 
341 (1949). 
54. Id. at 344 (explaining the “paradox” in this way: “The equal protection of the laws is a ‘pledge 
of the protection of equal laws.’ But laws may classify. And ‘the very idea of classification is that of 
inequality.’”). 











protection? The answer, in the authors’ view, is the idea of “reasonable 
classification” which they interpret as the requirement of some amount of 
fit between the trait used to classify and purpose it aims to achieve—which 
they term the “mischief.”55 Returning to the age restriction for obtaining a 
driver’s license, Tussman and tenBroek would say that this law is 
reasonable because age is a reasonably good proxy for the skill and maturity 
to drive safely. Or, if we want to keep the negative valence of the term 
“mischief,” we might say that young age (under 16) is a good proxy for 
lacking such skill and maturity. 
This fit framework helps to organize equal protection doctrine because it 
gives us a way to understand what happens as we move from rational basis 
review, to intermediate scrutiny, to strict scrutiny. As we ratchet up the 
scrutiny, the fit between the proxy trait and the target trait or traits must be 
increasingly tight. On this view, intermediate scrutiny requires more overlap 
between the proxy trait (sex) and the target trait than is required in rational 
basis review. And when we ratchet up the scrutiny level all the way to strict 
scrutiny, the overlap must be tighter still. 
The language of prominent sex discrimination cases seems animated, at 
least in part, by the fit framework.56 For example, Justice Brennan, writing 
for the Court in Craig v. Boren,57 emphasized lack of sufficient fit between 
the sex-based proxy and its target—a person likely to drink and drive. The 
law at issue in Craig provided that women could purchase low alcohol beer 
at age eighteen while men must be twenty-one. According to Justice 
Brennan, “[v]iewed in terms of the correlation between sex and the actual 
activity that Oklahoma seeks to regulate—driving while under the influence 
of alcohol—the statistics broadly establish that .18% of females and 2% of 
males in that age group were arrested for that offense”58—an overlap of 
proxy and target that was insufficiently tight, in the Court’s view, to pass 
intermediate scrutiny. 
The focus of the fit framework is on the degree of overlap between the 
sex-based proxy and its target. This way of understanding the demands of 
equal protection plays a significant role in sex discrimination doctrine, as 
Craig illustrates. While the fit framework helps to organize the doctrine, it 
also reveals the ways in which the constitutional law governing sex-based 
classifications is unsettled. First, the doctrine is not clear about just how 
tight the fit between the sex-based proxy and its target must be. We know 
 
55. Id. at 346–48. 
56. In addition to Craig v. Boren, discussed in the text, see, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677, 689–90 (1973) (“[A]dministrative convenience” is not a sufficient basis for differential 
treatment of men and women when the “Government offers no concrete evidence . . . tending to support 
its view that such differential treatment in fact saves the Government any money.”). 
57. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
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only that the degree of fit lies somewhere between very tight and very loose, 
but not much more. 
Second, the fit framework illuminates why some commentators 59—
Justice Scalia among them60—characterize the decision in United States v. 
Virginia61 as effectively applying strict scrutiny. On one reading of this 
case, the problem with VMI’s exclusion of women applicants was its 
reliance on “overbroad generalizations about the different talents, 
capacities, or preferences of males and females.”62 But how tight must the 
fit be? If intermediate scrutiny is to stand between rational basis review and 
strict scrutiny, it must be possible to demand a tighter fit than demanded by 
the Court in United States v. Virginia. Yet Justice Ginsburg, writing for the 
Court, appears to suggest that if there was even one woman with “the will 
and capacity”63 to succeed at VMI, then the exclusion of women would 
violate Equal Protection. It is precisely this demand for a “perfect proxy”64 
that Justice Scalia objects to: “There is simply no support in our cases for 
the notion that a sex-based classification is invalid unless it relates to 
characteristics that hold true in every instance.”65 Thus, not only do we not 
know how tight a fit so-called “intermediate scrutiny” demands between a 
sex-based proxy and its target, we do not know if genuinely intermediate 
scrutiny still applies. 
In addition, sex-based equal protection doctrine cannot be reduced to 
issues of fit. Another important organizing principle that animates 
constitutional sex discrimination law is a prohibition on stereotyping, 
considered below. 
B. Prohibition on “Stereotyping” 
A prohibition on stereotyping plays an important role in equal protection 
jurisprudence.66 While there is consensus that stereotyping is bad, there is 
 
59. See supra note 11. 
60. See infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
61. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
62. Id. at 533. 
63. Id. at 542. 
64. See Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex 
Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447 (1999) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court’s sex discrimination cases have always required that sex be a perfect proxy for the target 
trait). 
65. 518 U.S. at 574 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
66. See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) (“Care must be taken 
in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions.”); Orr v. 
Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979) (“Legislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on the 
basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing the stereotypes about the ‘proper place’ of women 
and their need for special protection.”). 











no consensus about what stereotyping is. 67  A stereotype relies on a 
generalization, 68  but are all generalizations stereotypes? 69  Consider, for 
example, the claim that “pit bulls are dangerous dogs.” This claim relies on 
a generalization about pit bulls and their proclivity to be aggressive.70 Is this 
also a stereotype? 
According to one view, only false generalizations are stereotypes.71 But 
even this claim is somewhat ambiguous. To say that a generalization is false 
could mean several different things. The claim that “pit bulls are dangerous” 
could be false if any pit bull is not dangerous. Alternatively, it could be false 
if there are more non-dangerous pit bulls than dangerous pit bulls. Or, it 
could be false if pit bulls are not more dangerous than your average dog.72 
This ambiguity about how to define what makes a generalization false and 
thus a stereotype—according to this conception of a stereotype—is relevant 
in Craig v. Boren, discussed above. To Justice Brennan, writing for the 
majority, the fact that only a small fraction (2%) of young men were likely 
to drink and drive was problematic.73 Yet, it was also the case that young 
men were approximately 10 times more likely to drink and drive than were 
young women.74 If falsity requires that more men are not likely to drink and 
drive than are young women, then the generalization that underlay the law 
 
67. A disagreement about how to define stereotyping is present in both the philosophical and the 
legal literature. Compare Erin Beeghly, What is a Stereotype? What is Stereotyping?, 30 HYPATIA 675 
(2015) [hereinafter Beeghly, What is a Stereotype?] (arguing for a non-moralized account of 
stereotyping according to which not all stereotyping is wrong), and Erin Beeghly, What’s Wrong with 
Stereotypes? The Falsity Hypothesis, SOC. THEORY & PRAC. (forthcoming) (on file with author) (arguing 
against the view that stereotypes are false generalizations), with Lawrence Blum, Stereotypes and 
Stereotyping: A Moral Analysis, 33 PHIL. PAPERS 251, 251 (2004) (arguing for the view that 
“[s]tereotypes are false or misleading generalizations about groups held in a manner than that renders 
them largely, though not entirely, immune to counterevidence” and finding them morally problematic 
for this reason). See also Kimberly A. Yuracko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex Stereotyping Prohibition at 
Work, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 757, 805 (2013) (looking “inside the black box of the sex stereotyping 
prohibition to see how the prohibition works in practice, as opposed to in theory or aspiration.”); Noa 
Ben-Asher, The Two Laws of Sex Stereotyping, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 1187 (2016) (arguing that there 
are “two primary branches of sex stereotyping law,” one which is prohibited and one which is permitted); 
Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 83 (2010) [hereinafter Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle]. 
68. Beeghly describes four different ways in which stereotypes employ generalizations, building 
on the philosophical work on “generics” by Sarah-Jane Leslie. Beeghly, What is a Stereotype?, supra 
note 69, at 676–77 (discussing Sarah-Jane Leslie, Generics and the Structure of the Mind, 21 PHIL. 
PERSP. 375 (2007)). 
69. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES (2003). 
70. This is Schauer’s example. See id. at 55–78. 
71. Blum, supra note 67 (arguing that stereotypes are generalizations that are false or 
misleading). 
72. Schauer discusses each of these alternatives with great detail. See SCHAUER supra note 69, 
at 55–78. 
73. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 201–02 (1976) (“[I]f maleness is to serve as a proxy for 
drinking and driving, a correlation of 2% must be considered an unduly tenuous ‘fit.’”). 
74. Id. at 201 (“[T]he statistics broadly establish that .18% of females and 2% of males in that 
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in Craig was not false. And if stereotypes are false generalizations, then the 
law could not have been struck down because it relied on a stereotype.75 
Relatedly, one might define a stereotype as an “overbroad” 
generalization.76 This conception of a stereotype has much in common with 
the fit framework discussed in the prior section. Indeed, conceiving of a 
stereotype as a false generalization (in any of the three ways discussed) or 
as an overbroad generalization is to understand the problem of stereotyping 
as related to the degree of fit between the sex proxy and its target. 
Alternatively, the concept of a stereotype may be defined in an entirely 
different manner, one that has nothing to do with the accuracy of the 
generalization at all. Three variants stand out in constitutional sex 
discrimination cases.  
First, a stereotype may be an “archaic” generalization.77 This phrase first 
appears in Schlesinger v. Ballard78 but recurs in many challenges to the use 
of sex-based generalizations.79 The idea, I take it, is that generalizations 
about women that are a product of culture, especially outdated cultural 
assumptions, are problematic. 
Second, a stereotype may be a generalization that denies either women 
or men important freedoms. As Justice Ginsburg emphasized in United 
 
75. Of course, the accuracy of the data itself could also be called into question, as did Justice 
Brennan when he noted that “‘reckless’ young men who drink and drive are transformed into arrest 
statistics, whereas their female counterparts are chivalrously escorted home.” Id. at 202 n.14. 
76. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (emphasizing that the policy at issue 
“must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of 
males and females”); Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1692–93, (2017) (invalidating a 
federal law that provided different treatment of unwed citizen-mothers as compared to unwed citizen-
fathers with regard to the transmission of citizenship to children born outside the United States in part 
due its reliance on “overbroad generalizations”). The understanding of a stereotype as a false or 
overbroad generalization seems to be the one adopted by the trial judge in the recent ruling in the Harvard 
admissions case, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 397 F. 
Supp. 3d 126 (D. Mass. 2019). There Judge Burroughs rejects the claim that individual judgments about 
the character or personality of Asian-American applicants rested on “stereotypes” when they concluded 
the applicant was quiet or hardworking because “the Court accepts that there are Asian American 
applicants who were ‘quiet’ and that the use of this word with regard to such an applicant would be 
truthful and accurate rather than reflective of impermissible stereotyping.” Id. at 157. 
77. See infra note 79 and accompanying text. 
78. 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (upholding rules that allow women naval officers more time for 
promotion than men naval officers under “up and out” promotion policies and asserting that the policy 
at issue does not rest on “archaic and overbroad generalizations, but, instead, the demonstrable fact that 
male and female line officers in the Navy are not similarly situated with respect to opportunities for 
professional service”). 
79. See, e.g., Nat’l Coal. for Men v. Selective Serv. Sys., 355 F. Supp. 3d 568, 579 (2019) (citing 
Schlesinger, 419 U.S. at 507–08) (invalidating male only draft and noting that argument in its favor 
“smacks of ‘archaic and overbroad generalizations’ about women’s preferences”); Free the Nipple-Fort 
Collins v. City of Fort Collins, 916 F.3d 792, 799–800 (10th Cir. 2019) (upholding preliminary 
injunction against law prohibiting women from exposing their breast but not men and noting that 
“statutes supposedly based on ‘reasonable considerations’ may in fact reflect ‘archaic and overbroad 
generalizations about gender’ or ‘outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females . . . .’”) (citing 
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994)). 











States v. Virginia, “[s]tate actors controlling gates to opportunity . . . may 
not exclude qualified individuals based on ‘fixed notions concerning the 
roles and abilities of males and females.’”80 On this view, laws and policies 
that rely on sex-based generalizations are problematic when, and to the 
extent that, they deny women or men either important freedoms or the 
freedom to depart from defined sex roles.81 
Third, a stereotype might be a demeaning generalization. To illustrate 
the contrast between a demeaning and non-demeaning generalization, 
consider the following example. I traveled to Italy with my older daughter 
when she was a baby. When people ask me whether that was difficult, I say 
it was not because “Italians love babies.” If only demeaning generalizations 
are stereotypes, then this is not a stereotype. 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion in United States v. Virginia provides support 
for the idea that a stereotype is a demeaning generalization. When she 
claims that “‘[i]nherent differences’ between men and women . . . remain 
cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the members of either 
sex,”82 she appeals to the idea that problematic sex-based generalizations 
are only those generalizations that are denigrating.83 
The prohibition on stereotyping is a central element of equal protection 
sex discrimination cases and yet, as this brief discussion makes clear, the 
concept of a stereotype is almost completely undefined. Perhaps a 
stereotype is simply an ill-fitting proxy, making this idea redundant of the 
fit framework. Or perhaps it has some meaning distinct from fit. If so, a 
stereotype might be an outdated generalization derived from cultural 
assumptions that are problematic (the “archaic generalization”). 
Alternatively, a stereotype might refer to a generalization that is 
problematic because it constrains the freedom of women and men, requiring 
 
80. 518 U.S. at 541 (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 714, 725 (1982)). 
81. Cary Franklin has argued that Justice Ginsburg was influenced in her views about what 
makes sex discrimination problematic by both John Stuart Mill and by the Swedish equality movement, 
both of which are grounded on the importance of liberty. See Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle, 
supra note 68 at 88–89. Some philosophers also see discrimination as wrongful when and because it 
denies people important freedoms. See, e.g., Sophia Moreau, What Is Discrimination?, 38 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF.143, 147 (2010) (arguing that “the interest that is injured by discrimination is our interest in a set of 
what I call deliberative freedoms: that is, freedoms to have our decisions about how to live insulated 
from the effects of normatively extraneous features of us, such as our skin color or gender”); Adam 
Hosein, Freedom, Sex-Roles, and Anti-Discrimination Law, 34 LAW & PHIL. 485 (2015) (arguing that 
the prohibition on sex-role stereotyping in U.S. law is best explained and justified by a Millian-based 
argument that we ought to protect people who are experimenting with different modes of living in order 
to support the ability of society to make social change). 
82. 518 U.S. at 533. 
83. See also Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975) (“[A] gender-based 
generalization cannot suffice to justify the denigration of the efforts of women who do work and whose 
earnings contribute significantly to their families’ support.”). My account of wrongful discrimination as 
discrimination that is demeaning is in accord with this view. See DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS 
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them to act in ways that are consistent with gender roles. Or perhaps a 
stereotype is a demeaning generalization. Each of these views finds support 
in some language in the cases and each can explain—albeit in different 
ways—why a sex-classification grounded in a stereotype, so defined, would 
be legally and morally troubling. 
The uncertainty does not end there. Equal protection doctrine governing 
the use of sex-based classifications contains an important exception. When 
sex-based classifications rely on so-called “real differences,” they are 
treated differently.84 Unfortunately, that doctrine fails to offer the clarity 
needed in sex-based equal protection doctrine. 
C. The Real Differences Exception 
Traditionally “real differences” are those that are biological.85 One might 
wonder why the fact that a sex-based classification tracks a biological 
difference between the sexes is legally relevant. Given the concepts around 
which the sex-based equal protection doctrine is organized, two responses 
come to mind. If differences are grounded in biology, perhaps the fit 
between sex and the target trait will be especially tight, even perfect. In 
addition, perhaps biologically-based differences deflect the claim of 
stereotyping. Each of these ideas has appeal, but each has familiar flaws as 
well.86 In addition, the real differences exception is itself plagued by internal 
tensions and confusions.87 As a result, the biological understanding of the 
real differences exception lacks a defensible and coherent normative 
foundation. 
1. Real Differences as Biological Differences 
The “real differences” exception treats differences as real if they are the 
result of biological differences between men and women, especially those 
biological differences that relate to reproduction. 88  In these cases, the 
biological is contrasted with the social or cultural. For example, in Michael 
M. v. Superior Court,89 the Supreme Court upheld a California law which 
 
84. See infra Part II.C. 
85. See infra Part II.C.1. 
86. See infra Part II.C.2. 
87. See infra Part II.C.3. 
88. What I am referring to as “real differences” are also often called “inherent differences.” See, 
e.g., Cary Franklin, Biological Warfare: Constitutional Conflict Over “Inherent Differences” Between 
the Sexes, 2017 SUP. CT. REV. 169, 172 [hereinafter Franklin, Biological Warfare] (emphasizing that 
“the only contexts in which constitutional law today seems to countenance sex-based limitations on 
individuals’ rights and opportunities are those involving reproductive biology—perhaps the sole 
remaining site of legally cognizable ‘inherent differences’ between the sexes”). 
89. 450 U.S. 464 (1981). 











punished men but not women who had sexual intercourse with a person 
below the age of consent. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality, 
emphasized that “this Court has consistently upheld statutes where the 
gender classification is not invidious, but rather realistically reflects the fact 
that the sexes are not similarly situated in certain circumstances.”90 The fact 
that only the woman could become pregnant was a real difference that was 
relevant to the Court because her ability/vulnerability to becoming pregnant 
meant that she risked consequences naturally, without the additional ones 
imposed by law.91 
The significance of the biological fact that women but not men can give 
birth was also the real difference on which the Court relied in upholding the 
sex-based differential treatment in immigration law in Nguyen v. INS.92 The 
law at issue in Nguyen governed how children born outside the United States 
to unwed parents, only one of whom is a citizen, could become a U.S. 
citizen. The child of a U.S. citizen-mother could become a citizen far more 
easily than a child of a U.S. citizen-father.93 This differential treatment on 
the basis of sex was permissible, in the Court’s view, because it was 
grounded in something real, by which the Court meant grounded in the 
biological facts of pregnancy and childbirth.94 
Reliance on biology also differentiates impermissible stereotypes from 
permissible “real differences” in the context of sex-specific physical 
training requirements. Justice Ginsburg suggests such sex-differentiated 
training requirements are constitutionally permissible in United States v. 
Virginia, despite the fact that they would require explicit sex-based 
 
90. Id. at 469 (emphasis added). 
91. Id. at 476 (stressing that the law does not rest on a stereotype but instead “reasonably reflects 
the fact that the consequences of sexual intercourse and pregnancy fall more heavily on the female than 
on the male”). 
92. 533 U.S. 53 (2001). To some commentators, this decision is better explained by the fact that 
the issue arises in the immigration context which calls for greater deference or by the fact that it affects 
unmarried fathers. See Nina Pillard, Plenary Power Underground in Nguyen v. INS: A Response to 
Professor Spiro, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 835 (2002); Franklin, Biological Warfare, supra note 88. 
93. For a child of unwed parents to become a citizen when the child’s father was the citizen 
parent, the law required proof of a blood relationship with the father; that the father was a U.S. national 
at the time of the child’s birth; that the father agreed in writing to provide financial support; that the 
child is “legitimated under the law of the person’s residence or domicile”; that the father acknowledge 
paternity in writing under oath; and that the paternity of the child be established in court. When the 
child’s mother was the citizen parent, the law did not provide the same requirements. 533 U.S. at 59–
60. 
94. In the Court’s view, the fact that the mother is present at the birth of the child both provides 
evidence of parenthood, which may not be present in the case of fathers, and ensures that the mother 
knows she has a child and thus provides her with the opportunity to develop a relationship with the child, 
which also might be lacking in the case of the unwed father. Id. at 65. According to the Court: “To fail 
to acknowledge even our most basic biological differences—such as the fact that a mother must be 
present at the birth but the father need not be—risks making the guarantee of equal protection superficial, 
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classification.95 Indeed, in Bauer v. Lynch, the Fourth Circuit upheld the 
acceptability of gender-normed physical training requirements against a 
Title VII-based challenge in part by explicitly leaning on the approval that 
the Supreme Court gave to different training requirements for female cadets 
in the VMI case.96 In that case, the Fourth Circuit permitted the FBI to 
establish different physical requirements for men and women because doing 
so “distinguish[es] between the sexes on the basis of their physiological 
differences . . . .”97 
2. The Rationale for Biological Real Differences 
Why might biology matter? It seems to matter because it purports to 
counter the equal protection problems identified by the fit framework and 
the prohibition on stereotyping. If a sex-based classification is biological, 
perhaps it provides a perfect proxy for the trait it is used to predict and is 
therefore unobjectionable. For example, the fact that a mother must be 
present at the birth of her child while a father need not be is treated as an 
inherent difference or perfect proxy in Nguyen.98 Alternatively, if the sex- 
based classification derives from biological differences between the sexes 
rather than differences that are a product of culture, then the sex-based 
classification may not conflict with any of the ways of understanding what 
constitutes a stereotype. 
As I explained earlier,99 the concept of a stereotype is understood in 
equal protection cases to refer either to something akin to the loose fit called 
out by the fit framework or as an archaic generalization, a generalization 
that constrains freedom, or a demeaning generalization. An archaic 
generalization is one that is grounded in cultural understandings of sex and 
gender that come from the past and are, arguably, outdated.100 If, instead, 
the sex-based classification tracks biological differences, then nature rather 
than culture is the cause of the differences, or so one might think.101 If 
 
95. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550–51 n.19 (1996) (explaining that “[a]dmitting 
women to VMI would undoubtedly require alterations necessary to afford members of each sex privacy 
from the other sex in living arrangements, and to adjust aspects of the physical training programs. See 
Brief for Petitioner 27–29; cf. note following 10 U.S.C. § 4342 (academic and other standards for women 
admitted to the Military, Naval, and Air Force Academies ‘shall be the same as those required for male 
individuals, except for those minimum essential adjustments in such standards required because of 
physiological differences between male and female individuals’”)). 
96. Bauer v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 340, 349–50 (4th Cir. 2016). 
97. Id. at 351. 
98. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
99. See supra Part II.B. 
100. See, e.g., Ben-Asher, supra note 67. 
101. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 17, at 917 (identifying one of the central questions of 
constitutional sex equality law in the following terms: “[A]re sex differences and their social 
 











stereotypes are defined as generalizations that inappropriately constrain 
freedom, biologically-based sex differences can serve to deflect the claim 
of stereotyping because any constraint on freedom is, arguably, 
unavoidable. Lastly, the biological basis of sex-based classifications could, 
for similar reasons, be thought to negate the inference that a generalization 
about women or men is demeaning. If it is natural, then it is not denigrating, 
or so the argument might go. 
These uses of the fact of biological difference are not successful in 
showing tight fit or a lack of stereotyping, on any of the possible meanings 
of those concepts. Biological etiology does not ensure that the fit between 
the sex-based classification and its target is perfect. Take the capacity to 
become pregnant. Biological sex is not a perfect proxy for the capacity to 
become pregnant. Not all women and girls can become pregnant for a 
variety of reasons. Biology might, nevertheless, ensure that the fit is 
sufficiently tight for intermediate scrutiny. Still, there may be problems as 
sex, as a biological category, is not without controversy. For example, 
disputes about whether female athletes whose natural testosterone levels 
exceed those allowed by the International Association of Athletics 
Federations can compete in women’s sports without lowering their 
testosterone medically102 suggests that the biological category of sex itself 
is not uncontroversial or easily applied.103 
Nor does the presence of a biological basis deflect a claim of 
stereotyping—on any of the three understandings of that concept unrelated 
to accuracy. On one thought, because the biological is natural, correlations 
between sex and a proxy trait grounded in biology cannot yield archaic 
cultural generalizations. In practice, however, the biological and the cultural 
are often intertwined so that one cannot easily separate the contribution each 
makes. Consider again Michael M. v. Superior Court.104 In that case, the 
Court treats the fact that young women but not young men can become 
pregnant as sufficient to justify the sex-based classification in the law 
because this biological fact ensures that women will not be in need of the 
additional deterrent that legal penalty might provide. But in fact it is not so 
easy to determine that a woman’s vulnerability to pregnancy is what 
 
consequences natural (and thus inevitable) or cultural (and hence subject to change)?”). Freedman also 
notes that the women’s movement has been skeptical of this biological emphasis. Id. at 915 (noting that 
“[s]ince its reemergence in the 1960’s, the American women’s movement has challenged both the social 
practice of subordinating women and the naturalistic arguments that attempt to sustain this practice”). 
102. For the challenge to these regulations brought by Dutee Chand, see Dutee Chand v. Athletics 
Fed’n of India (AFI) & Int’l Ass’n of Athletics Fed’ns (IAAF), CAS 2014/A/3759 (Court of Arb. for 
Sport 2015), https://www.tas-cas.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Bulletin_2015_2_internet_.pdf [https://per 
ma.cc/553D-EC5G]. 
103. For an interesting discussion of the legal challenges to these regulations by several athletes, 
see SOPHIA MOREAU, FACES OF INEQUALITY (2020). 
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provides the meaningful consequence that obviates the need for a legal one. 
After all, young women are also likely to face social consequences attached 
to sexual activity that young men will not. If the trait of interest that sex is 
being used to predict is needing or not needing legal penalty to deter sexual 
activity, the existence of a social factor in the mix makes it more difficult 
than the Court acknowledges to determine whether it is really biology that 
causes the observed correlation between sex and the trait of interest.105 
The fact that a difference is grounded in biology also fails to guarantee 
that the use of the sex-based classification will not constrain freedom in 
morally problematic ways, as prohibited by the second conception of 
stereotyping. 106  This is so because society chooses how it responds to 
biological difference.107 Just because a difference is biological in origin 
does not entail that a constraint it imposes on people is morally permissible. 
Lastly, a biologically based generalization may be a stereotype if we 
understand that term to refer to a demeaning generalization. But here also, 
a failure to respond to biological differences in a morally appropriate way 
may be denigrating. As a result, a biologically-based generalization about 
women or men could be demeaning and thus count as a stereotype. 
This critique of the significance of the distinction between nature and 
culture is not new108 and for that reason I do not dwell on it. The contribution 
of this Article lies elsewhere. I recap it here to make the point that even if 
the fit framework and the concept of stereotyping were sufficiently defined 
to organize sex-based equal protection doctrine, there is good reason to 
 
105. See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV. 
387, 419 n.152 (1984) (critiquing the Michael M. decision: “It is empirically true that in our present 
society these burdens [of teenage pregnancy] generally fall upon the female rather than upon the male, 
but it is important to realize that this is a social rather than biological fact. The social consequences of 
an unplanned conception are more severe for a young female than for a young male. Social arrangements 
rather than biological necessities cause the consequences of unplanned conception to fall mainly on the 
female.”). Justice Stevens hints at the importance of social consequences in dissent in Michael M., 450 
U.S. at 496 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Local custom and belief—rather than statutory laws of venerable 
but doubtful ancestry—will determine the volume of sexual activity among unmarried teenagers.”). 
106. For an insightful essay describing and critiquing the rhetoric of reliance on nature versus 
culture, see Elizabeth F. Emens, Against Nature, 52 NOMOS 293 (2012). 
107. See, e.g., Emens, supra note 106, at 294 (arguing that understanding nature as immutable, 
normative, and guileless is misguided as “these assumptions operate . . . so that a claim that, say, a 
gender difference in math skills is biologically based seems to imply that this difference can’t be 
changed, that it shouldn’t be changed, and that its effects aren’t society’s responsibility to address” which 
is not true as “[w]e see that nature is not always immutable, that it is not always assumed to be something 
we shouldn’t change, and that natural disasters are not always deemed less deserving of intervention 
than socially created ones”); Anita Silvers, Disability Rights, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF APPLIED ETHICS 
781, 785–86 (1998); Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 653–
59 (1999) (reviewing scholars who have described the social and cultural construction of disability). 
108. See supra note 107 and feminist scholars including, for example, SALLY HASLANGER, 
RESISTING REALITY: SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION AND SOCIAL CRITIQUE (2012) (exploring the idea of social 
construction especially as it relates to gender and race, and emphasizing that the fact that something is 
socially constructed does not imply that it is not real). 











conclude that grounding real differences in the biological would be 
unsatisfactory. 
3. Internal Confusion 
The real differences exception is also confused, conflicted, and eroding. 
To start, not all real differences cases rest on the biological. Some 
commentators see a second strand of real differences cases in which another 
law or policy (which is not before the Court) creates the relevant reality.109 
The paradigm case here is Rostker v. Goldberg,110 in which the Supreme 
Court upheld a law that required males to register for the draft but not 
females. Because, at that time, women were excluded from combat 
positions in the Armed Forces, “[m]en and women . . . are simply not 
similarly situated for purposes of a draft or registration for a draft.”111 The 
difference created by the combat restriction is treated as real and so the sex-
based registration requirement rests on a real difference, albeit one created 
by culture, not biology. 
While Rostker’s status today is unclear as Congress has repealed the 
statutory bar on women’s eligibility for combat positions,112 its presence in 
the doctrine nonetheless stands as an exception to the idea that real 
differences should be equated with biological differences in all contexts. 
In addition, a recent immigration case casts some doubt on the robustness 
of the biological basis in Nguyen,113 one of the doctrine’s central cases. 
Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 114  decided in 2017, considered the 
constitutionality of sex-based differential treatment in a different portion of 
the same law at issue in Nguyen. Like Nguyen, the focus in Morales-Santana 
was on how a child born abroad to couples, only one of whom is a U.S. 
citizen, can become a U.S. citizen.115 Rather than addressing how parentage 
is established (as Nguyen did), Morales-Santana focused on the sex-based 
differential in the residency requirements for the citizen-parent.116 The law 
provided that in the case of married couples, the citizen parent must reside 
 
109. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Hendricks, The State’s Compelling Interest in Substantive Equality, in 
CONTROVERSIES IN EQUAL PROTECTION CASES IN AMERICA: RACE, GENDER AND SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION, 167–80 (Anne Richardson Oakes ed., 2015). 
110. 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
111. Id. at 78. 
112. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-
190, § 531, 105 Stat. 1290, 1365 (1991); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. 
L. No. 103-160, § 541, 107 Stat. 1547, 1659 (1993); Nat’l Coal. for Men v. Selective Serv. Sys., 355 F. 
Supp. 3d 568, 582 (S.D. Tex. 2019) (holding that male-only draft is no longer constitutional), appeal 
docketed, No. 19-20272 (5th Cir. April 23, 2019). 
113. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
114. 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017). 
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for ten years in the United States prior to the birth of the child, at least five 
of which must be after the age of fourteen. This rule was amended to apply 
to unwed citizen fathers. However, an exception to this rule was provided 
for unwed U.S. citizen mothers that allowed them to convey citizenship to 
their children after only one year of residence in the U.S. prior to the child’s 
birth. 117  The differential treatment between unwed citizen-fathers and 
unwed citizen-mothers was challenged by the child of an unwed citizen-
father whose father did not satisfy the requirement that he be present in the 
United States for at least five years after age fourteen and prior to the birth 
of the child.118 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, struck down the sex-based 
differential treatment. Morales-Santana specifically distinguishes 
Nguyen.119 Still, one might think that the fact that Morales-Santana deals 
with sex-based differential treatment in the same law as Nguyen suggests 
that Nguyen itself might be overruled in the future, thereby constricting the 
applicability of the real differences exception.120 On the other hand, the 
cases deal with different requirements of the law. Nguyen dealt with the part 
of the law that established how the parent demonstrates that she or he is the 
parent, while Morales-Santana deals with the length of time that the citizen 
parent must have lived in the U.S. prior to the birth. The fact that the cases 
address different parts of the law matters because in Nguyen, sex is primarily 
a proxy for the reliability of the claim of parenthood while in Morales-
Santana, sex is a proxy for conveying American culture and values. 
However, this characterization is overstated. In Nguyen, sex is used as a 
proxy for parentage and for the parent knowing that she or he has a child—
a fact that is important if the parent is to develop a relationship with the 
child.121 The fact that the sex-based classification also serves the purpose 
(in the view of the Nguyen Court) of insuring a parent/child relationship 
 
117.  Id. 
118.  Id.  
119. Justice Ginsburg explicitly notes that “Morales-Santana’s challenge does not renew the 
contest over § 1409’s paternal-acknowledgment requirement” and that “the physical-presence 
requirements now before us relate solely to the duration of the parent’s prebirth residency in the United 
States, not to the parent’s filial tie to the child.” Id. at 1694. 
120. The case represents “a significant jurisprudential development” according to Cary Franklin. 
See Franklin, Biological Warfare, supra note 92, at 202. See also Stephanie Rock, One Step Forward 
and Two Steps Back: The Victory and Setback Issued by the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Morales-Santana, 33 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 177 (2018) (arguing that Morales-Santana is an 
important case in furtherance of gender equality but will have negative consequences for immigration 
and citizenship law). 
121. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 65 (2001) (explaining that the sex-based classification serves 
the interest of insuring that the parent and child have the opportunity to develop a meaningful connection 
and insisting that “[t]he mother knows that the child is in being and is hers and has an initial point of 
contact with him” while “[t]he same opportunity does not result from the event of birth, as a matter of 
biological inevitability, in the case of the unwed father”). 











brings the two cases closer together. 
Does Morales-Santana augur the constriction of the real differences 
doctrine? It is hard to say. But the case surely contributes the to the sense 
that the doctrine is in a state of flux. 
In addition, the elusiveness of the concept of “real differences” is 
dramatically illustrated in the strange debate playing out in the lower courts 
about whether laws that forbid women but not men from exposing their 
breasts and nipples in public actually involve a sex-based classification at 
all.122 According to the New Hampshire Supreme Court, a local ordinance 
that explicitly prohibited females but not males from exposing their breasts 
simply did not classify on the basis of sex. Rather, the ordinance prohibits 
both “men and women from being nude in a public place.”123 What counts 
as being nude for a woman just is different from what counts as being nude 
for a man and this (real) difference makes the sex-based classification 
disappear from view. The New Hampshire Court explains that “it is not 
enough that men and women be treated differently: they must be treated 
differently based upon a gender-based classification.”124 Because they are 
not, only rational basis review applies. The Seventh Circuit saw a similar 
ordinance in an entirely different way. In upholding an ordinance 
prohibiting only women from exposing their breasts in public, the Seventh 
Circuit acknowledged that the law contained a sex-based classification as it 
“plainly does impose different rules for women and men.”125 
One might wonder how it is possible for courts to disagree on this point. 
While I cannot be sure what the explanation is, the disarray of the sex-based 
equal protection doctrine is a good possibility. It is unclear when differences 
are real, or instead based on stereotypes. The fact that women’s bodies differ 
from men’s and there are different cultural assumptions about female and 
male nudity calls into question any distinction based real difference.126 In 
 
122. Compare State v. Lilley, 204 A.3d 198, 208 (N.H. 2019) (concluding that “the Laconia 
ordinance does not classify on the basis of gender”), cert. denied sub nom. Lilley v. New Hampshire, 
140 S. Ct. 858 (2020), with Tagami v. City of Chicago, 875 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 2017) (rejecting the 
claim that the “public-nudity ordinance does not actually classify by sex”). 
123. Lilley, 204 A.3d at 208. The New Hampshire Supreme Court interprets its own constitutional 
guarantee of equal protection, as well as the federal guarantee. Id. at 208–09. 
124. Id. at 210. 
125. Tagami, 875 F.3d at 380. 
126. The dissent in Tagami stresses that while “of course male and female anatomies are different 
. . . it is societal perception rather than form and function that categorically distinguishes the female 
breast from the male: in our culture, a woman’s breast has long been viewed as uniquely sexual and 
titillating.” Id. at 383 (Rovner, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bostock v. Clayton 
County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (holding that Title VII prohibits employers from dismissing employees 
because they are gay or transgender because this is a form of sex discrimination) is likely to lend support 
to the view that these laws banning exposure of the female breast but not the male breast do discriminate 
on the basis of sex, as Justice Gorsuch’s opinion in Bostock looks no further than the explicit reliance 
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addition, it is unclear what the upshot of finding a real difference is. Does it 
yield the result that heightened review does not even apply (as the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court holds) or does it instead provide a justification 
for the sex-based classification (as the Seventh Circuit concludes)? And if 
the latter, does the presence of the so-called real difference effectively lower 
the scrutiny that is in fact applied? 
This was obviously a whirlwind recap of the constitutional law 
governing the use of sex-based classifications. To recap, equal protection 
doctrine provides that sex-based classifications are subject to “intermediate 
scrutiny,” but that term provides only limited guidance. Instead, sex-based 
equal protection doctrine is best understood as animated by a demand for fit 
between the sex-based proxy and its target and a prohibition on 
stereotyping. While seemingly promising, these ideas bring only a patina of 
clarity to the doctrine. The degree of fit required by intermediate scrutiny is 
underspecified and the concept of stereotyping is open to several conflicting 
interpretations. In addition, there is an exception built into the doctrine. 
When the sex-based classification depends on “real differences” between 
men and women, either heightened review does not apply or it is applied 
more leniently (which effectively may amount to the same thing). At the 
same time, it is uncertain what differences are real. Usually the real is 
equated with the biologically-based, but not always (see Rostker127). And 
the biological/non-biological distinction faces important challenges in 
providing a normatively appealing or consistent account of when the laws 
are permissible and when they are not. 
III. REINVENTING REAL DIFFERENCES 
The fact that biology is unable to ground the “real differences” doctrine 
may lead one to reject this category altogether. Perhaps this aspect of 
constitutional sex-discrimination doctrine is itself an anachronistic holdover 
from an earlier time and one that we are best rid of. But before going down 
that road, we might do well to explore whether there is something 
worthwhile to salvage from the “real differences” exception. 128  The 
biological basis of the real differences exception is initially appealing 
 
127. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
128. Another way to put this question would be to ask: are all sex-based classifications the same? 
Or, should different levels of scrutiny be applied to some rather than others? I pose this question in a 
manner that is open to the possibility that the reasons we find for treating some sex-based classifications 
more deferentially than others could also apply in the race context as well. In other words, what we 
might learn from our exploration of sex-based classifications can be transposed to the race context. That 
will depend, of course, on what that is. A permissible sex-based classification that is grounded in nature 
is unlikely to be carried over into the race context. But if this exception is understood in a different way, 
its implications for racial classifications could be different. 











because it rightly picks up on the fact that it matters whether the sex-based 
proxy is merely correlated with the target trait or instead whether it is 
causally related to it. The biological account fails, however, because the fact 
of causation, on its own, lacks moral significance. Biology may matter 
because it sometimes works to deflect or negate a morally relevant causal 
hypothesis. In other words, it isn’t that biological causation itself matters. 
Rather, what matters is the presence or absence of a morally relevant causal 
account. 
A sympathetic reconstruction of the “real differences” doctrine locates 
its central insight in the claim that causation matters morally and so should 
legally as well. Where the doctrine goes wrong, however, is with regard to 
the specific causal mechanisms it treats as problematic and which as 
unproblematic. Rather than treating biological causation as less problematic 
and therefore deserving of less scrutiny than social causation, I argue that 
we should instead pay attention to whether prior sex-based injustice 
plausibly caused the correlation at issue. When the correlation between sex 
and some other trait is likely due to prior sex-based injustice, the use of the 
sex-based classification should be presumptively impermissible (via the 
application of heightened review). When no plausible story of prior sex-
based injustice explains the correlation between sex and the target trait, then 
no such presumption applies. This account suggests one important 
exception: when the sex-based classification is used to disrupt or dismantle 
the prior injustice, it should be permitted. 
I present the argument for this reconstruction of the real differences 
doctrine below. I begin in Part A with a brief primer on the distinction 
between correlation and causation and its significance. Readers familiar 
with these ideas should feel free to skip this section. In Part B, I present an 
argument for the moral principle that one should avoid compounding prior 
injustice. This principle—which I term the Anti-Compounding Injustice 
Principle or ACI—helps to distinguish when and why some sex-based 
classifications are presumptively impermissible and some are not. Finally, 
Part C demonstrates that the ACI principle is already inchoate in canonical 
constitutional sex discrimination cases. Together, Parts B and C thus 
demonstrate that the ACI principle both fits and justifies our law.129 
 
129. By appealing to fit and justification, the approach I take to constitutional law is Dworkinian. 
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 230–31 (1986) (explaining that an interpretation of the legal 
material must have “explanatory power” for most of the text and must “make[] the work in progress 
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A. Correlation and Causation 
The account I present begins by noting that sex is correlated with various 
target traits of interest, recidivism for example. The biologically-based real 
differences doctrine rests on the insight—correct in my view—that where 
we have a plausible causal story and not mere correlation, this can matter. 
It thus behooves us to get a clearer idea on the distinction between 
correlation and causation. 
Correlation is different from causation, and a common fallacy of 
empirical reasoning involves their conflation.130 A brief story illustrates the 
point. 
Three drunks: Three men go into a bar. The first orders vodka and water. 
The second orders scotch and water. The third orders gin and water. As the 
night wears on, each man orders several of his preferred drink. At the end 
of the night, all the men are drunk. You notice that each man drank water, 
and all are drunk. You conclude that water must be the cause. 
As this story illustrates, correlations can be misleading.131 While each 
man drank a lot of water, it isn’t the water that makes him drunk. If we don’t 
know that vodka, scotch and gin all contain alcohol, we miss the true cause 
and are misled by the correlation. 
While this principle is canonical, it can be overstated. Not all observed 
correlations should be treated the same. To see this point, consider another 
vignette. 
Two students: Two students, Jack and Jane, are talking. Jack says to Jane: 
“I used to think correlation implied causation. Then I took a statistics class. 
Now I don’t.” Jane replied: “Sounds like the class helped.” Jack replies: 
“Well, maybe.”132 
Jack has learned well the lesson that correlation does not entail causation. 
Just because his newfound understanding is correlated with his taking of a 
statistics class does not guarantee that taking the class caused the 
understanding. The association could be merely a correlation, like the 
correlation between drinking water and becoming drunk. 
However, he might have learned the lesson too well. Three drunks and 
Two students are different in an important way. In Three drunks, we have 
no theory about how or why water causes people to become drunk. In Two 
students, we do have a theory that explains the correlation. A statistics class 
teaches the students about the mistake of confusing correlation with 
 
130. See Raphael Sassower, Causality and Correlation, in THE WILEY BLACKWELL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL THEORY (Bryan S. Turner ed., 2017). 
131. My father used to tell this story to me when I was a child in order to illustrate the dangers of 
inferring causation from correlation. 
132. Correlation, XKCD, https://xkcd.com/552/ [https://perma.cc/7XSP-FW9Y]. 











causation. A correlation accompanied by a plausible causal theory is 
different from a correlation without such a theory. While a correlation 
between x and y, standing alone, may provide too little evidence to justify 
the belief in a causal relationship between x and y, the correlation combined 
with a plausible theory may be sufficient.133 
We can now see why the biological basis of the real differences 
exception might matter. The claim that underlies it is that we do not have 
merely a correlation between sex and some other trait. Rather we have a 
plausible theory of causation at well. As a result, if some laws treat males 
and females differently, these laws need not be subject to heightened review 
because the connection between sex and the other trait has more to it than 
mere correlation. On this view, what is real about real differences is that sex 
is causally related to the target trait. 
But wait. The fact that real differences pick out correlations with a 
plausible causal theory from those that lack it provides a reason to believe 
that the observed correlation is likely to endure and is not a mere fluke. But 
it does not provide us with a reason to support it, endorse it, or entrench it. 
The presence of causation and not merely correlation provides an epistemic 
justification for thinking that the relationship will continue; it does not 
provide a normative one to defer to it. 
For the fact of causation to matter normatively and not merely 
epistemically, something else is needed. I propose the Anti-Compounding 
Injustice principle to fill that gap. Current doctrine rests on the claim that it 
matters why sex is correlated with some trait of interest—a proposition with 
which I agree. However, biological causation does not adequately justify 
the legal permissibility it gives rise to. In the next section, I propose and 
defend an alternative account. 
B. Real as Morally Significant 
Sex-based classifications should be treated as constitutionally 
problematic when and to the extent that they compound prior sex-based 
 
133. By a plausible theory, I mean a theory with some evidentiary support. For an argument in 
support of the claim that “mechanistic evidence” (evidence of the manner in which A causes B based on 
an understanding of why or how the causal mechanism works) adds support to a causal claim beyond 
that provided by “difference making-evidence” (evidence of a correlation produced by reliable methods, 
like a randomized clinical trial or observational study). See Phyllis McKay Illari, Mechanistic Evidence: 
Disambiguating the Russo-Williamson Thesis, 25 INT’L STUD. PHIL. SCI. 139, 146 (2011) (explaining 
that each type of evidence compliments the other such that “[t]ogether they are much better evidence for 
the existence of a causal relation than evidence either of difference-making, or of mechanism, can be on 
its own” because “[f]inding a mechanism is one good way of increasing confidence that any relationship 
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injustice.134 This constitutional claim is grounded on a moral claim: the fact 
that an action will compound prior injustice provides a morally relevant 
reason to avoid that action. In this Part, I develop and defend this moral 
principle. 
Injustice produces effects on people and in the world. For example, a 
crime victim may be scarred emotionally in ways that make him more prone 
to violence himself or which make her more likely to be victimized again. 
Should the fact that injustice produced those effects constrain how others 
interact with these victims? I present two hypothetical examples that 
illustrate the plausibility of the claim that actors who are not themselves 
responsible for the prior injustice nevertheless have obligations to avoid 
compounding that prior injustice.135  
Risk assessment and the child abuse victim: Suppose Charles was a 
victim of abuse when he was a child. As a result, he has some psychological 
challenges and is himself prone to violent outbursts. Suppose he commits a 
crime, for which he is convicted and incarcerated. Now suppose further that 
Charles is being considered for parole and data suggest that victims of child 
abuse are more likely than others to recidivate. Should the fact that Charles 
was victimized as a child count against him in a state’s decision whether to 
grant him parole? 
Life insurance and the battered women: Suppose Barbara is a victim of 
domestic abuse. As a result, she is more likely to die during the upcoming 
year than a woman who is not an abuse victim. A life insurer, calibrating 
prices for insurance policies to the likelihood that the insured will make a 
claim during the policy period, will therefore charge higher rates to battered 
women than to similar others who are not abuse victims. Even if the battered 
woman leaves her abuser, she will be charged high rates by an insurer 
focused only on actuarial accuracy because women who leave are especially 
 
134. I do not mean to suggest that this is the only reason that use of sex-based classifications can 
be morally troubling. Indeed, I have argued elsewhere that discrimination is wrong when it is demeaning. 
See DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG?, supra note 22. Since writing that book, 
I have modified my view and been persuaded by Sophia Moreau that a pluralistic account may be best. 
See MOREAU, supra note 103. 
135. These examples are drawn from a previous article that argues that prohibitions on disparate 
impact liability are grounded in the duty to avoid compounding injustice. See Deborah Hellman, Indirect 
Discrimination and the Duty to Avoid Compounding Injustice, in FOUNDATIONS OF INDIRECT 
DISCRIMINATION LAW (Hugh Collins & Tarunabh Khaitan eds., 2018) [hereinafter Hellman, Indirect 
Discrimination and the Duty to Avoid Compounding Injustice]. While the examples I use to tap the 
intuition behind the anti-compounding injustice norm are the same as those I use in prior work, the claim 
of this paper is different. That book chapter focused on disparate impact liability; this Article focuses on 
the moral grounding for prohibitions on disparate treatment via explicit sex-based classification. In 
addition, the prior work does not focus on U.S. constitutional law while this paper defends the claim that 
the ACI norm undergirds U.S. constitutional doctrine. 











at risk.136 Should the insurer charge Barbara higher life insurance rates than 
it would charge if she were not an abuse victim? 
In my view, there is something morally troubling about the state or the 
insurance company acting rationally by using prior victimization to predict 
a target trait (recidivism, getting an insurance pay out). In each case, the 
prediction is accurate. Still, something bothers me, and I hope you, as well. 
What makes each case problematic, in my view, is the fact that the actor 
(the state, the insurer) takes a bad situation and makes it worse. The actor 
compounds the prior injustice.137 Not only was Charles a victim of child 
abuse, but that prior abuse and the harm it caused him now mean he will 
remain in prison longer than he would otherwise. Not only was Barbara a 
victim of domestic violence, but that prior abuse now makes it more costly 
for her to purchase life insurance. The fact that the state and the insurer 
would augment or deepen the effect of the prior injustice provides a reason 
for each to act otherwise. This intuition forms the heart of the moral 
argument that actors should avoid compounding prior injustice. 
For an action to compound injustice, two features of the action are 
necessary. First, the action must amplify or entrench the injustice. Second, 
the actor must interact with or involve herself in the prior injustice in some 
manner, rather than being simply a bystander to it. These two features track 
the two meanings of the word “compound.” As a verb, to “compound” is to 
make something that is bad worse.138 As a noun, a “compound” is mixture 
of two elements.139 In Charles’s case, the state compounds (in the sense of 
amplifies) the prior injustice Charles suffered. Not only was he victimized 
as a child (and must endure the abuse’s effects on his psyche ; now he must 
stay in prison longer than if he had not suffered that prior abuse. Second, 
the state involves itself with this injustice because it takes his victimization 
as the reason to raise his risk score. Similarly, in Barbara’s case, the insurer 
amplifies the injustice Barbara suffered. Not only was she beaten; now she 
must pay more for life insurance. In addition, the insurer involves itself in 
this injustice because it charges her higher rates because she is the victim of 
 
136. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, Is Actuarially Fair Insurance Pricing Actually Fair?: A Case 
Study in Insuring Battered Women, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 355 (1997). 
137. Pauline Kim argues that when classifications entrench systemic disadvantage, this constitutes 
“classification bias” and should be actionable. See Pauline T. Kim, Data Driven Discrimination at Work, 
58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 866 (2017). Her view is limited to situations in which legally protected 
groups are disadvantaged by the use of classification systems and so her principle is narrower that the 
ACI principle and is grounded in a reading of statute rather than animated by a normative principle. 
138. Compound vb, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY (1976) (“to add to: augment”). 
139. Compound n, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY (1976) (“something (as a 












To be sure, the state has good reasons not to release Charles. The 
interests of other people—those whom he may harm if he is released—count 
as well. And the insurer has good reason to charge Barbara higher rates. If 
it does not, others will share the cost of later harms that come to her. 
Compounding injustice is not a decisive reason to avoid an action in all 
contexts. Rather, the fact that an action will compound prior injustice 
provides an important normative reason that weighs against that action 
which should be included in the balance of reasons when an actor, including 
the state, decides how to act. 
It is important to note that the argument drawn from the moral intuition 
in both Charles’s and Barbara’s cases does not depend on an argument that 
the actor (the state, the insurer) was itself responsible for the prior injustice. 
Rather, I claim that actors should count the fact that an action will 
compound prior injustice as a reason to avoid it, even if they bear no 
responsibility for the original injustice. 
The argument I offer rests on a moral intuition, which I hope the reader 
shares, that using the fact that Charles and Barbara are abuse victims to 
determine whether he will be released on parole and she will be charged 
high insurance rates is morally troubling. Interestingly, this moral intuition 
finds support in the social science literature. For example, in a study of when 
and why policymakers permit or prohibit the use of credit scores to 
determine insurance pricing, sociologist Barbara Kiviat finds that 
policymakers care why credit scores predict insurance claim-making.141 
Credit scores predict (are correlated with) the making of car insurance 
claims. 142  Yet their use is still controversial. Kiviat finds that people’s 
approval of credit-based pricing depends on why people believed that poor 
credit and insurance claims were correlated. 143  The policymakers she 
studied cared about the causal story explaining the correlation, not simply 
its reliability.144 If people thought that credit scores predict insurance claims 
because fiscally irresponsible people tend to also drive carelessly, then they 
 
140. When insurance regulation prohibits actuarially-based pricing, it forces a sharing of the costs 
of the harm that comes to individuals. Whether one sees this as a positive or negative of such a policy 
depends on whether one thinks that the cost of the harm should be shared. KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, 
DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 18–20 (1986) (describing the 
different considerations in cost sharing or risk distribution). 
141. Barbara Kiviat, The Moral Limits of Predictive Practices: The Case of Credit-Based 
Insurance Scores, 84 AM. SOC. REV. 1134, 1144 (2019) (explaining that “[p]olicymakers wanted to 
understand why credit scores predicted insurance loss in order to determine if any links in the causal 
chain held the wrong people to account, and as a consequence gave them prices they did not deserve”). 
142. Id. at 1135 (“As it turns out, credit scores are quite good at predicting which consumers will 
file insurance claims and otherwise cost companies money.”). 
143. Id. at 1146. 
144. Id. at 1144. 











approved the use of the credit scores in insurance pricing. But if, instead, 
they thought that the correlation was explained by the fact that poor people 
have weak credit because they are poor, and that poor people make more 
car insurance claims because their financial need leads them to file small 
claims that wealthier insured drivers don’t bother to file, then people found 
credit-based pricing should be prohibited. 145  Given these results, the 
policymakers in Kiviat’s study seem to endorse a similar moral intuition to 
the one on which the ACI norm rests. 146  If credit scores reflect prior 
injustice, then a policy—even a predictively accurate one—that compounds 
that injustice should be avoided. 
Of course, the fact that others share the moral intuition that avoiding 
compounding injustice is an important moral principle does not demonstrate 
that the principle is sound. Still, if one shares this moral intuition, Kiviat’s 
study provides some confirming evidence for its soundness. 
The ACI account also finds support in its theoretical usefulness. For 
example, the ACI account helps to explain a puzzle that exists within equal 
protection doctrine. Why are sex-based classifications problematic when 
used in admissions at VMI but not when used to set training standards there 
or at the FBI?147 The ACI-based approach would direct courts to ask two 
questions. First, is the correlation between sex and the target trait plausibly 
explained by prior sex-based injustice? If the answer to that question is yes, 
the ACI approach moves to the second question. Does use of the sex-based 
classification compound that injustice? This approach helps to explain why 
the exclusion of women from VMI is an easy case, while the adoption of 
sex-specific training standards is more controversial. It is likely that a 
significant part of reason so few women have the desire148 to attend VMI is 
due to the fact that women have been socialized to think that military careers 
are for men and not for women. As this socialization practice cuts women 
off from a career path that is uniquely tied to citizenship, it constitutes an 
injustice. Using sex to determine whom to admit would compound this prior 
injustice. For this reason, a policy of admitting only men should be 
presumptively impermissible. 
Now consider training requirements which set different standards for 
men and women. The ACI approach directs court to ask whether the fact 
that sex is correlated with strength is most plausibly due to prior injustice. 
 
145. Id. at 1146 (explaining that “depending on a person’s theory of why credit scores predict 
insurance claims, credit-based insurance scores can register as either fair or unfair”). 
146. Id. at 1152 (contending that an account that focuses only on predictive accuracy is unable “to 
appreciate how bad luck or the inequities of history can set events in motion and cause people to show 
up in the data in particular ways”). 
147. See Bauer v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2016). 
148. Justice Ginsburg’s opinion speaks of the “will and capacity” but I here focus on the 
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While prior injustice may have led women to develop their physical abilities 
less than men have, and sex-based injustice may have led institutions to 
focus on abilities at which men excel physically rather than those at which 
women excel,149 the causal hypothesis that injustice caused the observed 
correlation is far less clear. However, even if we assume, for the sake of 
argument, that the correlation between sex and the target trait is plausibly 
the result of prior injustice, the ACI approach directs courts to ask a second 
question. Will sex differentiated training standards compound that 
injustice? The answer to that question is most likely no. Use of sex-based 
classification to set different training requirements for men and women is 
likely to expand opportunities for women. The ACI approach thus helps 
explain why sex-based classification is prohibited in one context and 
permitted in the other. 
In this Part, I have provided an argument for the Anti-Compounding 
Injustice principle. According to the ACI principle, the fact that an action 
will compound prior injustice provides a reason—though not a dispositive 
reason—to avoid it. The argument began with two hypothetical examples 
that were designed to elicit the moral intuition that compounding injustice 
is morally troubling. I then provided some evidence that this intuition is 
endorsed by others. Lastly, I demonstrated that the ACI principle is useful, 
showing that it unravels a familiar puzzle in which sex-based classifications 
are impermissible when used to set admissions standards but permissible 
when used to set training standards. 
As a complete philosophical defense of the moral obligation to avoid 
compounding injustice, this argument is just a beginning. Nonetheless, I 
hope the account provided is sufficient to demonstrate the plausibility of the 
ACI principle. Questions surely remain. In particular, one might wonder 
whether the ACI principle is best understood as providing actors with a 
reason to avoid compounding the injustice suffered by a particular 
individual. If so, a critic might worry about cases in which the plaintiff him 
or herself has not suffered sex-based injustice. There are possible answers 
to this worry, including the idea that if the correlation between sex and a 
target trait was caused by injustice then each women is at risk of having 
suffered a sex-based injustice. Alternatively, one might construe the 
obligation to avoid compounding injustice in a more forward-looking 
way. 150  On this view, the duty to avoid compounding injustice is best 
 
149. Studies have found that while men generally are stronger, women have better endurance. See, 
e.g., Sandra K. Hunter, The Relevance of Sex Differences in Performance Fatigability, 48 MED. & SCI. 
SPORTS & EXERCISE 2247, 2247 (2016) (finding that “[a]lthough skeletal muscles of men are usually 
stronger and more powerful than women, men are often more fatigable than women for sustained or 
intermittent isometric contractions performed at similar relative intensity . . . .”). 
150. Ben Eidelson offered this suggestion. 











understood as part of the state’s (or an individual’s) duty to ensure that 
society is structured fairly. I plan to take up these and other complexities of 
the account in further work. 
Next I revisit canonical sex-based equal protection cases and 
demonstrate that the ACI norm is inchoate in that doctrine. 
C. The Anti-Compounding Injustice Principle in Constitutional Law 
Existing sex-based equal protection doctrine, especially cases in its 
heartland, can easily be seen as grounded in the ACI norm. Consider, for 
example, the early sex discrimination case Reed v. Reed.151 There the Court 
invalidated a law preferring men to women in the selection of estate 
administrators. In 1971, when the case was decided, it was probable that 
men were more likely, on average, to have the relevant skills than were 
women. If we merely focus on the tightness of the fit between the sex-based 
proxy and its target (people with financial skills), we miss an important part 
of what is morally troubling about this case. As Catherine MacKinnon 
pointed out long ago,152 if a society were even more sexist than 1971 United 
States, such that the fit between sex and financial skills were tighter still 
because women had even fewer educational opportunities, this better fit 
would not make the sex-based classification more justified. Rather than 
focus on the predictive accuracy of the classification, we should instead 
examine why sex is a good proxy for having or lacking the financial skills 
and training to be a good estate administrator. The likely reason that female 
sex was correlated with lacking this training is that women were 
discouraged or restricted from the relevant educational opportunities. Were 
the law to permit sex to be used to decide who should have the additional 
opportunity of administering a relative’s estate, the sex-based classification 
would reinforce or compound the prior discrimination.153 The fact that the 
Court invalidated the sex-based classification is thus better explained by the 
ACI principle than by the fit framework. 
Reed v. Reed is not an isolated example. Many constitutional sex 
discrimination cases in which the Supreme Court disallowed a sex-based 
classification can be better explained by the principle that the Constitution 
resists the entrenchment of prior injustice than by either the fit framework 
 
151. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
152. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX 
DISCRIMINATION 108 (1979). 
153. In a prior article, I argue that the moral obligation to avoid compounding injustice provides 
a justification for disparate impact liability. In this section, I explore the way this same rationale also 
applies to the heart of equal protection jurisprudence: disparate treatment. See Hellman, Indirect 
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or the prohibition on stereotyping. 154  For example, Frontiero v. 
Richardson155 struck down a federal law that provided that male service 
members would automatically get dependency allowances for their spouses 
but that female service members would need to prove their spouses were 
dependent to be entitled to such allowances. In that case, like in Reed, sex 
was likely a reliable proxy for dependency. Yet the Court did not allow its 
use. If we ask why sex was a good proxy for dependency, the following 
account is a plausible hypothesis. Sex-based injustice in society had 
prevented women from entering the work force in similar numbers as men. 
In addition, norms about a wife’s role within marriage led married women 
to stop working when they had children and/or to put their career second 
and follow their husband when his work required relocation. For all of these 
reasons, more female spouses were likely to be dependent on their male 
partners than the reverse. Equal Protection doctrine’s resistance to the use 
of a sex-based proxy for dependency can thus be justified by the principle 
that the state should avoid compounding this injustice. 
I should note that I am not claiming that the Court in Frontiero explicitly 
relied on the ACI principle. Indeed, it did not. Frontiero itself seems to find 
the problem to be one of ill-fit 156  and a governmental purpose that is 
inadequate.157 The fit framework analysis is strained, however, as sex was 
strongly correlated with dependency. 158  The ACI principle thus better 
explains the result. 
The claim that the ACI principle explains and justifies most canonical 
sex-based equal protection cases may face resistance from the fact that 
many of these cases involve male plaintiffs who are disadvantaged by laws 
that explicitly treat men and women differently.159 As these men surely have 
not suffered the same history of disadvantage and discrimination that 
women have, how can the ACI approach explain the fact that these sex-
based classifications are also invalidated? To this challenge, I have two 
replies. 
First, the subgroup of men who wish to occupy roles that are traditionally 
 
154. It is difficult to evaluate how well the anti-stereotyping principle works to explain canonical 
cases because the principle is subject to many and conflicting interpretations. See supra Part II.B. 
155. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
156. Id. at 689–90 (“[A]dministrative convenience” is not a sufficient basis for differential 
treatment of men and women when the “Government offers no concrete evidence . . . tending to support 
its view that such differential treatment in fact saves the Government any money.”). 
157. Id. 
158. The Court stresses that 41.5% of all married women are employed. Id. at 689 n.23. But the 
Court does not discuss whether the wives of service members have a similar level of employment. 
Because the Court applied strict scrutiny in this case, this degree of fit was clearly not sufficient to pass 
muster. Id. at 690–91. 
159. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); 
Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 











seen as female may well have suffered prior sex-based injustice. The moral 
imperative to avoid entrenching or compounding this injustice may explain 
and justify some male-plaintiff cases. Mississippi University for Women v. 
Hogan160 provides an apt example. There, the Supreme Court invalidated 
the female-only admissions policy at a state nursing school. While women 
had not been disadvantaged with respect to the opportunity to become 
nurses,161 men may well have been. Prevailing views about nursing as a 
profession appropriate only to women likely constrained the opportunities 
available to men interested in nursing. Were the school to admit only 
women to the nursing school on the grounds that sex is correlated with 
having a desire to nurse, the school would reinforce the sex-based injustice 
that produced this correlation. The ACI norm can explain this case by 
focusing on the prior injustice to gender non-conforming men. 
A second answer to the challenge posed by the prevalence in the doctrine 
of male-plaintiff cases would stress the difference between having standing 
to bring the claim and being injured in the precise way that the constitutional 
protection is meant to vindicate. The ACI analysis would proceed as before. 
We begin by observing that sex is correlated with the trait of interest (T). 
We then ask why sex is correlated with T? If the most plausible causal 
account runs through sex-based injustice, then the court would go on to ask 
whether use of the sex-based classification would entrench that injustice. If 
the answer to that question is yes, the classification is presumptively 
impermissible. The male plaintiff must have been injured by the policy to 
have standing to bring the claim, but he need not have himself suffered a 
sex-based injustice.162 
The ACI principle also explains what makes the biologically-based 
understanding of the real differences exception initially appealing. When 
sex-based classifications correlate with another trait T because biological 
sex-linked traits plausibly cause T, the causal mechanism by which sex is 
linked to T helps to negate a causal theory that runs through injustice. In 
other words, biology matters not in itself but because it plausibly refutes a 
hypothesis that injustice is in play. In this sense, my account fits the real 
differences cases reasonably well and provides a more attractive 
justification for them. 
 
160. 458 U.S. 718 (1982). 
161. In fact, Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, stresses that in 1970, “women earned 94 
percent of the nursing baccalaureate degrees conferred in Mississippi and 98.6 percent of the degrees 
earned nationwide.” Id. at 729. 
162. Whether a plaintiff has standing is distinct from questions about the best way to conceive of 
the underlying merits of the claim. See Jonathan R. Siegel, What If the Universal Injury-In-Fact Test 
Already Is Normative?, 65 ALA. L. REV. 403, 404 (2013) (“The Supreme Court still regards standing as 
a generalized Article III requirement through which a plaintiff must pass to reach the merits of a case, 
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The focus on biological causation, however, misses the reason that sex- 
based classifications are often impermissible. If the ACI norm justifies (at 
least in part) the law’s resistance to sex-based classification, then when sex- 
based classifications are used to block or dismantle prior injustice, this 
reason to avoid them is not present. As a result, the ACI approach may 
permit sex classifications used to dismantle injustice. This is an important 
difference between the ACI-based reconstruction of real differences and the 
biological explanation. 
It is important to emphasize that the ACI norm is not, thereby, endorsing 
the use of sex-based classifications as a form of compensation or affirmative 
action. Rather, the point is that if the reason that sex-based classifications 
are constitutionally and morally problematic is that they compound prior 
injustice, then when their use does not compound prior injustice, this reason 
to avoid them is simply absent.163 
I have so far shown that the ACI principle provides a better account than 
does current doctrine of core constitutional sex-discrimination case like 
Reed and Frontiero. It is easy to extend that account to other similar cases. 
In addition, I have demonstrated how the ACI principle explains the 
seeming paradox in United States v. Virginia, which prohibits the use of sex-
based classifications in admissions but signals their permissibility in 
training standards. While male-plaintiff cases might seem to present a 
problem for this account, I have shown that they do not because the ACI 
principle prevents the compounding of prior injustice to gender non- 
conforming men or because standing and merits inquiries are distinct. 
Lastly, I have used the ACI principle to explain the seeming appeal of the 
biological interpretation of the real differences doctrine. Together these 
arguments show that the ACI principle coheres well with existing case law. 
There is one important counter-argument to that claim that remains. The 
doctrine’s treatment of disparate impact cases creates an important 
challenge to the claim that the ACI principle undergirds current sex-based 
equal protection doctrine. 164  Consider, for example, Personnel 
Administrator of Massachussetts v. Feeney. 165  In Feeney, the Supreme 
Court declined to invalidate the use by Massachusetts of a lifetime 
preferences for veterans in civil service employment despite the fact that 
 
163. Justice O’Connor seems to endorse this line of reasoning in Mississippi University for 
Women v. Hogan when she notes that “a gender-based classification favoring one sex can be justified if 
it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is disproportionately burdened.” Hogan, 458 
U.S. at 728. 
164. See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (upholding a lifetime 
preference for veterans in civil service jobs despite the significant disparate impact this rule had on the 
employment prospects of women so long as the rule was not adopted “’because of,’ not merely ‘in spite 
of,’ its adverse effects upon” women). 
165. Id. 











this policy severely disadvantaged women. The Court upheld the policy 
because it was facially neutral and had not been adopted in order to keep 
women out of the civil service. 166  In so doing, the Court permits 
Massachusetts to compound the prior injustice of women’s exclusion from 
military service. Not only were women excluded from the military, but, 
under the Massachusetts policy, that exclusion becomes the basis for their 
further exclusion from good jobs in the civil service. 
The Supreme Court’s rejection of disparate impact liability—absent a 
showing that the facially neutral law was intended to produce the disparate 
impact 167—works in Feeney and in other contexts to compound prior 
injustice. For example, injustice in opportunities, including education and 
employment, causes people to lack skills and income that are relevant to 
employers and lenders. If these employers and lenders may hire or lend to 
people on the basis of their lack of a good education or a well-paying job, 
despite the disparate impact thereby produced, then current constitutional 
law permits the compounding of injustice. Does the fact the equal protection 
doctrine rejects disparate impact liability count as a counter-example to the 
claim that the ACI principle is inchoate in constitutional law? 
This is an important challenge to the account and requires a reply. I have 
two. First, the objection is not as damaging as it initially seems. Often the 
effect of prior injustice cannot be captured in an easy to apply alternative 
trait. The veteran’s preference compounds prior injustice because the prior 
injustice limited women’s ability to become veterans. But not all cases have 
this form. Consider, for example, the fact that unjust socialization patterns 
may make women more likely to work fewer hours than men. Prohibiting 
the use of a sex-based classification by state employers prohibits the 
compounding of injustice. Without this prohibition, the state employer 
might have used sex as a proxy for the likelihood of working fewer hours 
or being more likely to prioritize child-care duties. But because future action 
cannot be screened for directly at the time of employment, this prohibition 
does prevent the compounding of injustice in such a case and a substantial 
number of others.168  
That said, there is still power to the objection. The fact that U.S. 
constitutional doctrine does not recognize disparate impact liability does 
allow injustice to be compounded to a significant degree. The account I put 
 
166. Id. at 279–80. 
167. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding the use of a written test by the District 
of Columbia Police Department despite its disparate impact on racial minorities). 
168. Similarly, states may not use race to predict recidivism in the criminal justice context. The 
prohibition helps to prevent the compounding of injustice. Much compounding is still allowed by the 
fact that disparate impact standing alone does not raise constitutional concerns. However, because 
recidivism is a future action, it cannot be tested for directly and so the prohibition on racial classifications 
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forward here thus puts pressure on that part of the doctrine. For this reason, 
my second reply to the challenge posed by the lack of disparate impact 
liability in constitutional law is to suggest that the fact that this doctrine is 
at odds with the principle that best explains cases in the heartland of sex-
based equal protection jurisprudence is a reason to revise that doctrine. If 
the reason that sex classifications are problematic constitutionally is, at least 
in part, because they compound injustice, then sex-based disparate impact 
is more constitutionally troubling that has been so far acknowledged. The 
ACI account is thus potentially revisionary. If one accepts the normative 
argument of the previous section, equal protection doctrine should be open 
to claims of disparate impact liability.169 
In this section, I have demonstrated that the ACI principle can be seen as 
animating cases at the heart of sex-based equal protection law and that it 
provides a good explanation for the real differences exception to that 
doctrine. This reconstruction of real differences interprets the focus on the 
biological as a stand-in for a causal explanation that negates a story of 
injustice. Together these two pieces of interpretive constitutional law 
provide an account that both fits the doctrine reasonably well and provides 
a justification for it. In the next Part, I apply that approach to the context of 
sex-based classification in predictive risk assessment tools. 
IV. SEX-BASED CLASSIFICATIONS IN RISK ASSESSMENT 
I now return to the issue I raised at the start: May criminal risk assessment 
tools use sex-based classifications? In Loomis, the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin left open—tantalizingly—the question whether the state’s use of 
sex-based classifications in predictive algorithms violates equal 
protection. 170  How can the ACI account of sex-based equal protection 
doctrine help to answer that question? 
According to the ACI approach, courts must focus on two questions. 
First, courts must ask whether the observed correlation between sex and 
recidivism (or sex and violence) is plausibly caused by prior sex-based 
injustice. If the answer to that question is yes, courts should go on to ask 
whether the use of a sex-based classification in the algorithm will compound 
that prior injustice. On the ACI approach, what makes a difference real is 
normative not empirical: real differences are differences that are plausibly 
 
169. This is not to say that such claims would always succeed. Statutory antidiscrimination law 
allows for disparate impact liability while at the same time recognizing that laws that produce a disparate 
impact on protected groups can be justified by the needs of businesses, for example. See 42 U.S.C § 
2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2018). Some scholars believe that gender disparities, particularly in the platform 
economy, are better addressed with protections other than an expansion of antidiscrimination law. See 
Naomi Cahn, June Carbone & Nancy Levit, Discrimination By Design?, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (2019). 
170. See supra Part I. 











explained by a morally relevant causal theory. 
It is now time to apply that approach to the use of sex-based 
classifications in recidivism risk algorithms. A judge considering whether a 
state may use sex to predict recidivism, or to predict violence, using a risk 
assessment tool must evaluate whether it is plausible to think that the 
correlation between sex and crime or sex and violence results from prior 
gender-based injustice or not. 
To fully answer these questions requires a more in-depth treatment than 
I can provide but here are some preliminary thoughts. One might think that 
a biological explanation is available. If so, this could negate a hypothesis 
that sex-based injustice is to blame. However, the evidence about the causal 
connection between testosterone and violence is conflicted. 171  So, we 
cannot rule out injustice via a biological causal story. 
Is there reason to think sex-based injustice causes the correlation 
between sex and violence? Perhaps. I am uncertain about this because even 
if sex-based socialization is the reason for the difference, it is not clear that 
all sex-differentiated socialization practices are unjust. Admittedly that is a 
controversial claim with which others may disagree. 
However, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the correlation 
between sex and crime or sex and violence is caused by prior injustice, we 
still must go on to ask whether using the sex-based classification would 
compound that injustice. To assess whether an injustice is compounded, we 
need to focus on how the sex-based classification at issue actually operates 
in this context. There are several possibilities. An algorithm may use sex as 
one of the traits on the basis of which it calculates recidivism—in such a 
case, sex is part of the screening algorithm.172 Alternatively, the data set 
from which the algorithm is developed (called the “training data”) could 
label people with a sex characteristic.173 If this occurs, the algorithm could 
learn that sex is predictive of recidivism.174 But, if sex is not predictive, or 
not sufficiently predictive, it will not yield this outcome. Third, sex can be 
 
171. See EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
RESPONSE 39 (3d ed. 2003) (citing several studies showing the “testosterone link is perhaps the most 
researched and proven biological link to violent behavior”). But see Christopher Mims, Strange But 
True: Testosterone Alone Does Not Cause Violence, SCI. AM. (July 5, 2007), https://www.scientificamer 
ican.com/article/strange-but-true-testosterone-alone-doesnt-cause-violence/ [https://perma.cc/6ULE-U 
Z6J] (“[T]he latest research about testosterone and aggression indicates that there's only a weak 
connection between the two. And when aggression is more narrowly defined as simple physical violence, 
the connection all but disappears.”); Nancy E. Dowd, Sperm, Testosterone, Masculinities and 
Fatherhood, 13 NEV. L.J. 438, 453–54 (2013) (citing studies to argue “[o]ne of the strongest myths about 
testosterone concerns the relationship between testosterone and violence. Testosterone does not cause 
aggressiveness, and if aggressiveness is limited to physical violence, there is virtually no connection”). 
172. For a helpful discussion of the distinction between the training algorithm and the screening 
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used to determine which group of people to compare an individual to in 
developing the risk score.175 In other words, women offenders could be 
compared only to other women and men offenders compared only to other 
men. By comparing each sex only to members of their own sex, a woman 
who is risky for a woman, but who nonetheless still has a relatively low-risk 
score (pre-norming) as compared to people in general, will be judged to be 
fairly risky. This means of using sex-based classifications would benefit 
men and harm women because women are less likely to commit crime than 
are men. COMPAS used sex in this way176 and it was this third method of 
using sex-based classifications that was at issue in Loomis.177 
Interestingly, the effect of using sex in the screening algorithm or in the 
training data differs significantly from the effect of using sex to create 
norming groups. Women are likely to benefit from the use of sex in either 
of the first two ways and men are likely to benefit from using sex in the third 
way.178 While both men and women have suffered gender-based injustice,179 
the bulk of gender-based injustice has harmed women. As a result, the use 
of sex to create norming groups is more likely to compound injustice and 
could thus be impermissible according to the ACI account. 
However, when sex is used in the screening algorithm or the training 
data, but not in creating norming groups, it may work to dismantle injustice 
(if injustice were present) and so should be treated as presumptively 
permissible.180 
The ACI approach thus allows for a nuanced analysis of the controversial 
question whether sex-based classifications may be used in predictive 
algorithms. The first question it asks is whether the correlation between sex 
 
175. Lightbourne, supra note 7, at 330. 
176. NORTHPOINTE, PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE § 2.9 (2015), http://www.northp 
ointeinc.com/downloads/compas/Practitioners-Guide-COMPAS-Core-_031915.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
X3J8-EPZ3]. 
177. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 765 (Wis. 2016) (the state argued that “the DOC uses the 
same COMPAS risk assessment on both men and women, but then compares each offender to a 
‘norming’ group of his or her own gender”). 
178. Michael Tonry has found that a sentencing instrument that directly uses gender as a variable 
in the calculation work to women’s benefit. See Tonry, supra note 7, at 170. Jennifer Skeem, John 
Monahan & Christopher Lowenkamp found that a gender-neutral instrument can overestimate the 
likelihood of recidivism for women when women’s scores on the assessment are not compared to gender-
specific recidivism rates. See Jennifer Skeem, John Monahan & Christopher Lowenkamp, Gender, Risk 
Assessment, and Sanctioning: The Cost of Treating Women Like Men, 40 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 580, 
590 (2016) (“Unless gender-specific recidivism rates are considered when interpreting PCRA scores . . . 
the instrument will overestimate women's probability of recidivism.”). 
179. See supra note 162 and accompanying text for a discussion of male-plaintiff cases. 
180. I should note that on my view, sex-based classifications are morally and constitutionally 
problematic for two reasons. They may compound injustice (the issue under discussion) and they may 
be demeaning. See HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG?, supra note 22. A complete analysis 
must thus consider both whether the use of the sex-based classification compounds prior injustice and 
whether it is demeaning. 











and the target trait is plausibly caused by sex-based injustice. My 
provisional answer to that question is equivocal. When sex is used to predict 
other target traits, this analysis may yield a different answer. If the 
correlation between sex and some target trait is plausibly caused by sex-
based injustice, the ACI account directs courts to ask whether the use of the 
classification will compound that prior injustice. Because sex-based 
classifications can be used in several ways, the ACI approach yields 
different answers depending on how the sex-based classification functions. 
What courts should focus on is whether use of the classification compounds 
prior injustice that plausibly caused the correlation between the sex-based 
proxy and its target. 
In assessing any account of an area of law, we should expect it to provide 
a good explanation of the clear cases and help us to navigate complex cases. 
The ACI approach does just this. It better explains cases in the heartland of 
sex-based equal protection doctrine and shows why they are easy cases. 
And, it provides an analysis that allows us to parse the complexity of the 
myriad ways that sex classifications can be used in predictive algorithms. 
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: SHOULD THE PAST BE PROLOGUE?  
“Whereof what’s past is prologue; what to come,  
In yours and my discharge.”181 
These words, from Antonio in Shakespeare’s The Tempest, come as 
Antonio attempts to convince Sebastian to murder his brother. Here, 
Antonio suggests that the past does not determine the future but instead 
merely sets the scene. Strangely, the phrase “what’s past is prologue” has 
come to mean just the opposite, that the past significantly constrains the 
future. The fact that both meanings derive from the phrase makes it an apt 
epigraph for some final thoughts on the question addressed in this Article. 
We have long used data to make decisions about the future. What is new in 
the era of big data and machine learning is the combination of dramatically 
increased amounts of data and significant computational power which can 
detect patterns that human beings might otherwise have missed. Together 
these technologies are likely to alter the relationship between the past and 
the future. 
How much we embrace or resist the effect of the past on the future is 
especially pressing when the past contains injustice. This is not a new 
problem. The moral problem of compounding injustice has been with us for 
a long time. What is new is the potential scope of the problem. With more 
data and a greater ability to identify patterns between facts about people and 
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outcomes in the world, big data together with machine learning are likely to 
compound injustice to a much greater extent. For this reason, it is important 
to revisit the moral dimensions of this relationship. 
Scholars have long asked whether a flawed past gives rise to moral duty 
to compensate victims of injustice.182 The call for “reparations” is part of 
this mode of analysis.183 The claim of this Article is different. Using sex 
discrimination and the law of “real differences” as a lens, I argue that actors 
have a moral obligation to avoid entrenching or compounding prior 
injustice. The obligation I posit is not compensatory. Instead, it requires 
states and other actors to refrain from making a bad situation worse. 
 
182. See, e.g., Bernard R. Boxill, A Lockean Argument for Black Reparations, 7 J. ETHICS 63 
(2003). 
183. Id. 
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